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ABSTRACT 
As the all-hazards approach takes hold in our national Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security efforts and continues to seek greater collaboration between these two 
fields, an area that has yet to be explored to its fullest extent is the utilization of an 
intelligence process to enhance EM operations. Despite the existence of multiple Federal-
level policies that outline the importance of intelligence and information sharing across 
the all-hazards community, EM is still by-and-large an outsider to the Intelligence 
Community (IC); the problem is one of both policy and of practice. Formalizing both an 
intelligence process and EM role culled from best practices of the FBI, U.S. Military, and 
local law enforcement, and subsequently equipping and training emergency managers in 
the use of intelligence would be substantially beneficial in all phases of a disaster. Once 
established, an intelligence process could also help EM augment and integrate into the IC 
to provide more robust HS capabilities, including a significant role in the State/Local 
Fusion Centers. This formalized EM Intelligence Cycle (EMIC) lays the groundwork for 
better EM-IC collaboration, better support to first responders during large-scale events, a 
more proactive role in preventing future disasters, and a more robust all-hazards 
community as a whole. 
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As the all-hazards approach takes hold in our national Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security efforts and continues to seek greater collaboration between these two 
fields, an area that has yet to be explored to its fullest extent is the utilization of an 
intelligence process to enhance EM operations. Despite the existence of multiple Federal-
level policies that outline the importance of intelligence and information sharing across 
the all-hazards community, EM is still by-and-large an outsider to the Intelligence 
Community (IC). The problem is one of both policy and of practice; despite the existence 
of some federal policies, not enough has been explored or fleshed out, and what has been 
fleshed out is not implemented on any sort of national scale. 
Key among these deficiencies is the collection and use of intelligence by the EM 
community; no formalized method for supporting or utilizing this capability within the 
EM community currently exists. The lack of familiarity with this overarching and 
powerful national capability creates a disconnect within the all-hazards community and 
thereby inhibits collaboration, resource efficiency, and a proactive national posture, 
concepts vital to the success of the all-hazards approach. Could a refined and well-
developed method for intelligence gathering and synthesis within the EM community 
help strengthen current operations, as well as foster better collaboration with the broader 
Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE)? Is there a benefit to pushing for EM inclusion into 
the larger IC, and how best could the EM community support this all-hazards approach to 
ensure the benefit was mutual to both communities?  This thesis addresses these 
questions, and explores the benefits a formalized intelligence process could have for the 
EM field, as well as the benefits it brings the all-hazards community as a whole.  
By definition, the intelligence process does not necessitate criminal activity; 
rather, it is simply a well-defined method of information gathering and subsequent 
analysis. As such, EM intelligence could support a more robust decision-making process 
within the EM community and the HS community at large. In many ways, the EM field 
already has a role (albeit a support role) in response operations to all-hazards events, 
including terrorism, and thus has a vital role in this information gathering/analysis 
 xiv 
process. Formalizing this role and subsequently equipping and training emergency 
managers could be of substantial benefit to jurisdictions in all phases of a disaster. Real 
world examples of how an EM intelligence process was, or could have been, utilized to 
bolster EM’s current capabilities within each of FEMA’s five mission areas further 
illustrates the potential benefits of a more formal intelligence process.  
In order to most effectively develop this intelligence process model and test the 
hypotheses, the research is two-tiered. The first step is to evaluate key portions of the 
intelligence processes from various members of the IC through case studies to glean 
relevant elements and procedures. These best practices come from the military 
(intelligence preparation of the battlespace), the current U.S. IC (domestically 
represented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and processes currently used by 
local jurisdictions (intelligence-led policing). These processes have an abundance of open 
source material available, and there are some clear similarities between the different 
members of the IC and their methods of analysis, synthesis, and delivery. Through 
extracting these concepts from those sources, I establish a working model of an 
intelligence process for EM, including steps, a flow diagram, and other key guiding 
principles that appear to be essential for success. With key causal factors identified and 
confirmed, a model developed from the aforementioned principles from the IC is then 
translated to the EM community. 
The ideal end result is a model that is scalable, functional, easily implemented, 
and utilized by any level of government. Through this formalized model, the Emergency 
Management Intelligence Cycle, the groundwork is laid for better support to first 
responders during large-scale events, a more proactive role in preventing future disasters, 
and a more robust all-hazards community as a whole. The EMIC also fosters better 
collaboration with and integration into the IC through the State/Local Fusion Centers and 
give each state a more comprehensive HS/EM community, able to prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from disasters of all shapes and sizes. 
The thesis concludes with a series of four recommendations that take the EMIC 
from conceptual stages to full implementation. The recommendations include 
consideration of cost, personnel, and resources essential to carry this project through to 
 xv 
completion. With the EMIC in place, the all-hazards approach gains a valuable asset 
towards the goals of greater inter-disciplinary collaboration, maximizing resource 
efficiency, and a more proactive posture towards incidents that threaten our national 
safety and security. 
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The field of homeland security (HS) as we know it is much like any other field of 
study offered by institutions of higher learning: it reflects an evolution of theory and 
research that is as varied as the incidents we encounter. In the crucible of several large-
scale terrorist events and natural disasters, our modern homeland security enterprise 
(HSE) has emerged from the Civil Defense days with a more comprehensive and 
standardized approach to disaster and incident management.   
One of the more recent and profound shifts in the field within the last decade is a 
blurring of the line between the traditional areas of responsibility of both HS (man-
made/terrorist events) and emergency management (natural disasters). This approach, 
dubbed “all-hazards” by both government and practitioners, seeks to capitalize on 
similarities in both preparedness and response to both types of incidents, and thereby 
reduce inefficiencies and redundancies in the use of resources and personnel. The 
Incident Command System is a good example of this; it is used in field operations by the 
military, police, and fire teams, and emergency managers have adopted the system for use 
in governing their Emergency Operations Centers during “all-hazards” incidents.1 
The subsequent rhetoric and proliferation of this all-hazards concept throughout 
federal policy has been substantial; the approach is now a staple in emergency 
management (EM) and responder communities throughout the nation. However, the 
implementation has not been without significant challenges. Cultural barriers, varying 
degrees of reluctance and resistance to change, and stove pipes of resources and 
responsibilities all slow the pace of innovation and collaboration. There is also a glaring 
deficiency in capabilities between the different disciplines being melded together under 
the all-hazards umbrella, as the traditional roles that have dictated the use of a certain set 
of “tools” and skills necessary to conduct operations now overlap. Among these 
deficiencies is the collection and use of intelligence, as the EM community in particular 
has no formalized method for supporting or utilizing this capability. The lack of 
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Intelligence/Investigations Function Guidance 
Document” Version 3 (Draft), February 2008, 2. 
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familiarity with this overarching capability creates a disconnect within the all-hazards 
community and thereby inhibits collaboration, a concept vital to the success of this 
approach. With this is mind, this thesis will attempt to explore the benefits an intelligence 
process could have for the EM field, as well as the benefits it brings the all-hazards 
community as a whole.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The all-hazards approach was first introduced on a National Policy level with the 
release of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD) in 2003.2  However, it 
remained largely conceptual until it gained structure with 2011’s Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 (PPD-8), which heavily emphasized the preparedness phase of disaster 
management, and issued the edict for the development of the National Preparedness Goal 
(NPG) and National Preparedness System. It also emphasized collaboration towards all-
hazards proficiency:  “while this directive is intended to galvanize action by the Federal 
Government, it is also aimed at facilitating an integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based 
approach to preparedness.”3  PPD-8 also decreed that the Federal Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) would begin work on five frameworks, one for each mission 
area of disaster management (Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and 
Recovery), and were to be coordinated under “a unified system with a common 
terminology and approach, built around basic plans that support the ‘all-hazards’ 
approach.”4   
Subsequent to the release of PPD-8, significant progress has been made on the 
actions required with the release of the National Disaster Recovery Framework 
(September 2011), the National Prevention Framework (May 2013), the National 
Mitigation Framework (May 2013), and a second edition of the National Response 
Framework (May 2013).5  As part of the development of these frameworks and the 
                                                 
2 George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, December 2003, 1. 
3 Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8, March 2011, 1. 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Planning Frameworks,” 
www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks. 
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national proliferation of the all-hazards approach, a Strategic National Risk Assessment 
was conducted, the results of which “affirmed the need for an all-hazards, capability 
based approach to preparedness planning.”6  The concept has since worked its way 
throughout the litany of Federal guidance for agencies involved with all phases of 
disaster management, solidifying the intent to promulgate the all-hazards approach as the 
national standard. In fact, the federal rhetoric implies that the implementation is 
considered fundamentally complete, as identified in the 2012 National Preparedness 
Report: “The Nation has established the foundation for an integrated, all-hazards 
planning architecture that considers routine emergencies and catastrophic events.”7  
The approach eventually bled over into the larger HSE, and now resides as part of 
our overall National Security Strategy (NSS) as issued by the White House.   The NSS 
pledges a more concerted effort to, “integrate homeland security with national security; 
including seamless coordination among Federal, state, and local governments to prevent, 
protect against, and respond to threats and natural disasters,”8 recognizing both the 
breadth (multiple agencies) and depth (multiple levels of government) that are included in 
the approach. All-hazards has thus been firmly established at the Federal Policy level as 
the current way forward for the nation, and much emphasis in both time and resources 
has been placed on its implementation.   
The all-hazards approach, when viewed from a macro level, has three overarching 
goals: 
• Increasing collaboration among HSE partners to maximize capabilities 
through mission-sharing and broadening cooperation. This is best 
exemplified by the volumes of national-level policy from multiple federal 
agencies that now include the all-hazards approach, including the NSS. 
Among the NSS’ goals is “Effectively Managing Emergencies,” which 
strives for “integrating domestic all hazards planning at all levels of 
government and building key capabilities to respond to emergencies.”9 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (First Edition), September 
2011, 3. 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report, March 2012, i. 
8 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, 2. 
9 The White House, NSS, 18. 
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• Reducing inefficiencies in resource utilization, primarily through efforts 
such as the regionalization of assets, whereby equipment and technical 
specialists are shared across a region rather than filling the capability for 
each and every jurisdiction.  (For example, a set of four geographically 
close towns sharing a regional bomb squad, as opposed to each town 
housing their own squad at quadruple the cost.)  Federal agencies have 
already taken this approach, as evidenced by the National Infrastructure 
Protection Program (NIPP) supporting an all-hazard approach to Critical 
Infrastructure/Key Resource (CI/KR) protection.10  The NIPP thus 
recognizes that risk assessments to a building for a man-made event have 
significant overlaps with a similar assessment for a natural disaster. 
• Enhancing and improving the national posture in all phases of disaster 
management, be it man-made or natural. From the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security:  “An effective all-hazards response effort must begin 
with a strong foundation based on clear roles and responsibilities across all 
levels of government and the private and non-profit sectors, strengthened 
doctrine to guide our national response, a joint planning process to 
improve response capabilities, and advance readiness activities to better 
prepare for an impending or emergent event.”11 
Although these goals are not stated explicitly in federal guidance, the concepts in 
my estimation are readily identifiable and explain the substantial shift in policy and 
approach being undertaken from a federal level. The HSE is attempting to be shrewder, 
smarter, and better prepared. 
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFIED 
A key tenet of the all-hazards approach is collaboration across the multiple 
partners and levels of government involved in incident management, including the 
sharing of critical information and intelligence through new and established channels to 
strengthen all members of the HSE. Primarily situated in the prevention and protection 
phases of the National Preparedness System, intelligence and information sharing are part 
of the “all-hazards approach to National Preparedness,”12 and are outlined as follows in 
the NPG: 
                                                 
10 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007, 26. 
11 U.S. HS Council, 32. 
12 DHS, NPG, 2. 
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“Intelligence and Information Sharing–Provide timely, accurate, and actionable 
information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, 
processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of 
available information concerning threats to the United States, its people, property, 
or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter 
bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by Federal, state, local, and other 
stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, 
information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local, or private sector 
entities, as appropriate.  
• Anticipate and identify emerging and/or imminent threats through the 
intelligence cycle.  
• Share relevant, timely, and actionable information and analysis with 
Federal, state, local, private sector, and international partners and develop 
and disseminate appropriate classified/unclassified products.  
• Ensure Federal, state, local, and private sector partners possess or have 
access to a mechanism to submit terrorism-related information and/or 
suspicious activity reports to law enforcement.”13 
Intelligence and Information Sharing are identified as a core capability that spans 
the prevention and protection missions, which is understandable given that the intent is to 
use these capabilities to interdict an event before it happens. As such, the definition above 
still leans towards the prevention of a terrorist attack, as seen in Item 3. However, true to 
all-hazards form, the capability does not limit the capability, or preclude the use, of 
intelligence in events outside the criminal realm, i.e., natural disasters. In fact, it can be 
asserted that while the timing of an event may be relatively unpredictable, the effects of a 
natural disaster are not as random as we currently view them. This concept will be 
discussed more in Chapter V. 
On a state and local level, this intelligence function would traditionally be held by 
local law enforcement, or in many large metropolitan areas in the U.S., the State/Local 
Fusion Centers (SLFC). Along with all other capabilities identified in the NPG, SLFCs 
are directed to adopt the all-hazards approach through the collection and dissemination of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 6. 
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intelligence to all community partners. Additionally, “fusion centers position law 
enforcement, public safety, emergency management, fire service, public health, critical 
infrastructure protection, and private security personnel to understand local implications 
of national intelligence.”14  
Despite the existence of multiple Federal-level policies that outline the 
importance of intelligence and information sharing across the all-hazards community, 
EM is still by-and-large an outsider to the Intelligence Community (IC). The problem is 
one of both policy and of practice; despite the existence of the aforementioned policy, not 
enough has been explored or fleshed out, and what has been fleshed out is not 
implemented on any sort of national scale. First identified as a weakness by the 9/11 
Commission, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,15 and President George 
Bush,16 progress towards the ideal end state has seen minimal success. In fact, the 
National Preparedness Report (NPR) of 2012 found that of the seven areas identified as 
“national strengths,” the only one to not be assessed in the top 10 capabilities from a 
State perspective was the Intelligence and Information Sharing capability.17  The 2013 
NPR showed minimal improvement, with this capability barely cracking the top 10;18 
however, this “improvement” is questionable given the reliance on a SLFC self-
assessment tool that limits consideration of how robust a statewide intelligence capability 
is outside of the SLFCs.19 Seemingly strong from a national level, the policy has not 
made its way into the State level and below, which is detrimental to our EM and first 
responder communities who are the most heavily involved in day-to-day operations.   
In addition to the lack of inclusion in the IC, EM has lagged far behind in 
establishing a process and function for the collection and use of intelligence. While 
                                                 
14 DHS, NPR-2012, 12. 
15 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “United States Intelligence Community Information 
Sharing Strategy,” (February 2008), 3. 
16 George W. Bush, “Using 21st Century Technology to Defend the Homeland,” available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/21st-technology.html. 
17 DHS, NPR-2012, ii. 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report, March 2013, 8. 
19 Ibid., 19. 
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counter-terrorism experts have long used well-refined method of intelligence gathering 
and analysis, EM lacks the training and tools to broaden its understanding and role in the 
IC as more than just a consumer of whatever intelligence products are dictated to be 
pertinent for their review. EM should be a sensor, consumer, and producer of 
intelligence, and if truly integrated, would prove to be a mutually beneficial partner with 
the IC. 
C. IMPACT ON CURRENT OPERATIONS 
Because EM is not included in the IC and does not have a formalized process for 
Intelligence collection and processing, all three of the all-hazard goals identified above 
are negatively impacted.   
• Collaboration is limited and capabilities are not maximized, most clearly 
evidenced by the lack of State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and 
SLFC relationship. Here again we see the existence of national policy that 
is largely ignored at the State level and below. A joint DHS/Department of 
Justice report from 2012 found that, “more than 83% of the (SLFC) 
locations visited were either unaware of or did not utilize federal guidance 
for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center interaction provided 
in Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502.”20  This lack of collaboration 
is largely unexplained and somewhat ironic, as both the EOC and the 
SLFC are by nature collaborative, bringing multiple jurisdictions and 
resources together for a common goal. Yet the majority of these 
champions of partnership do not work together despite a significant 
overlap in responsibilities and capabilities. A key connection between 
state level assets and partners is thereby missing, a piece that limits a 
common operating picture during events that are under the purview of 
both entities. This is further exacerbated by a lack of common language 
and understanding of intelligence, and therefore the connection to 
maximize capabilities is impeded. 
• Resource utilization is not currently optimized, either, as there is a clear 
overlap of responsibilities between the IC and emergency managers and 
seemingly little effort to eliminate the redundancies. For example, the area 
of CI/KR risk analysis and protection is a common theme to both the IC 
and EM. While the IC looks at the facilities from a terrorist angle as they 
conduct Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) assessments, EM 
personnel are also required to assess the same facilities and aid them 
through the phases of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery 
                                                 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Relationships Between Fusion 
Centers and Emergency Operations Centers, December 2011, 1. 
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during an event of significance. How much more effort would be required 
to conduct these simultaneously, or at least share the information as a 
foundation for the EM assessments (or vice versa)?  Time, effort, and 
expertise are wasted in the duplicitous assessment of these facilities. 
Systems such as the Automated Critical Asset Management System 
(ACAMS)21 are housed in either the SLFC or EOC, with the same entity 
being designated as the point of contact and thereby controlling access to 
the system. For example, in a large metropolitan city this responsibility is 
seated with the SLFC; no personnel at the State EOC have been given 
access. Although ACAMS isn’t a law enforcement/fire service specific 
program, the use of ACAMS is tied to the Terrorism Liaison Officer 
(TLO) program and since the SLFC has “taken the approach that 
emergency managers aren’t included in the TLO program,”22 access to 
this particular State’s ACAMS has neither been offered nor granted to the 
EOC. This same redundancy can be found in the area of Hazardous 
Materials Tier II reporting as the information is collected by state EM or 
the SLFC yet is not stored in a shared database where both agencies may 
access and update any information.   The United States “cannot afford to 
protect all things from all threats and hazards; therefore, critical decisions 
must be made about how to invest limited resources to achieve the greatest 
results.”23  One of the easiest decisions would be to eliminate the 
stovepipes that prevent intelligence being gathered by and shared amongst 
“need-to-know” partners and reducing duplicitous data gathering efforts. 
• Intelligence is a key piece of prevention and protection (as mentioned in 
the NPG); because EM is not a member of the IC and does not currently 
have a process for gathering, analyzing, and using intelligence, a key 
capability is missing that is “central to the process of preparedness. They 
(collaboration and information sharing)…are predicate elements that 
enable agencies, jurisdictions, and organizations to effectively perform the 
other elements of prevention.”24  Attempts have been made over the years 
to mitigate and prepare for natural disasters, but these efforts have been 
overshadowed by the incessant focus on response capabilities. The result 
is that EM maintains a reactive posture, rather than a proactive one as 
evidenced by “the default position of most responder agencies, as 
suggested by the label ‘response’ to an event.”25  This posture is most 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS), 
http://www.dhs.gov/automated-critical-asset-management-system-acams. 
22 Personal communication with State EM Operations Section. 
23 William O. Jenkins (2007), Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House 
Committee on Appropriations (GAO Report No. GAO-07–386T), 1–2.  
24 William V. Pelfrey, The Cycle of Preparedness:  Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2 (1, Article 5), 9. 
25 Ibid., 1. 
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accurately depicted in Federal spending on the various phases of EM:  in 
FY2013, State & Local Programs (covering all 4 phases) were budgeted 
$654M; the Disaster Relief Fund (overwhelmingly focused on response 
and recovery, with minimal funds given to mitigation and preparedness) 
was slated for $6.088B.26  This funding, at first glance, could reflect a 
solid foundation in preparedness, thereby allowing for an emphasis on 
recovery. However, this is not the case, and is more accurately identified 
as the inability of the EM community to swing the pendulum to the 
preparedness and mitigation phases. Intelligence, and the use of, is critical 
to that swing.   
• The lack of intelligence is detrimental to routine EOC operations, 
as well. Without the ability to analyze and synthesize the volumes 
of information coming into the EOC during an activation, data is 
not culled and consolidated outside of situation reports. 
Information alone is not intelligence; you need some mechanism to 
process the information into some sort of usable, actionable 
format. Information sharing alone leads to subjective 
interpretations, not a much more critical Common Operating 
Picture. Additionally, instruments critical to preparedness and 
protection, such as risk assessments, are not utilized or 
incorporated into EOC decision-making during events.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
As this all-hazards approach takes hold and continues to blend the best of the two 
sub-fields (HS and EM), an area that has yet to be explored to its fullest extent is the 
utilization of an intelligence process to enhance EM operations. Could a refined and well-
developed method for intelligence gathering and synthesis within the EM community 
help strengthen current operations, as well as foster better collaboration with the broader 
HSE? Is there a benefit to pushing for EM inclusion into the larger IC, and how best 
could the EM community support this all-hazards approach to ensure the benefit was 
mutual to both communities? 
The question this thesis will attempt to answer is: Is there a role for an 
intelligence process within the emergency management field? If so, what role could it 
play, what would the process look like, and how best could it be implemented to improve 
the all-hazards homeland security enterprise? 
                                                 
26 Federal Emergency Management Agency, The State of FEMA, 2012, 38. 
 10 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
By definition, the intelligence process does not necessitate criminal activity; 
rather, it is simply a well-defined method of information gathering and subsequent 
analysis. As such, EM intelligence could support a more robust decision-making process 
within the EM community and the HS community at large. In many ways, the EM field 
already has a role (albeit a support role) in the response operations to all-hazards events, 
including terrorism, and thus has a vital role in this information gathering/analysis 
process. Formalizing this role and subsequently equipping and training emergency 
managers could be of substantial benefit to jurisdictions in all phases of a disaster.   
Once established, an EM intelligence process could also help augment and 
integrate into the IC to provide more robust HS capabilities. EM has a significant amount 
of information that would be of use to the IC that is not currently shared (i.e., HazMat 
Facilities), and could also provide situational awareness during large-scale events for 
factors that aren’t readily discernible in the field (i.e., weather forecast, locations of 
critical infrastructure). This integration into the IC would include greater collaboration 
with the SLFC to give each state a more comprehensive HS community, able to prepare 
for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all shapes and sizes. 
My hypothesis is that the establishment, refinement, and consistent use of an 
intelligence process could swing the EM pendulum from the reactive to the proactive. 
Borrowed from best practices in the current IC, and adapted to ensure a process that 
better reflects the all-hazards goal, the potential benefits include:  decreased in response 
time by pre-positioning resources; enhanced situational awareness; and the inevitable 
reduction of recovery costs due to advanced information gathering, processing, and 
addressing vulnerabilities before they were affected.   
F. METHOD 
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether or not intelligence has a role in EM 
and if a well-defined intelligence process for EM can contribute to the all-hazards 
community. If the evidence suggests there is a role for intelligence in EM, then the next 
step is to develop a model for the use of an intelligence process within the EM 
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community. In order to most effectively develop this intelligence process model and test 
the hypotheses, my research is two-tiered. The first step is to evaluate key portions of the 
intelligence processes from various members of the IC through case studies to glean 
relevant elements and procedures. These best practices come from the military 
(intelligence preparation of the battlespace), the current U.S. IC (domestically 
represented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and processes currently used by 
local jurisdictions (intelligence-led policing). These processes have an abundance of open 
source material available, and there are some clear similarities between the different 
members of the IC and their methods of analysis, synthesis, and delivery. Through 
extracting these concepts from those sources, I establish a working model of an 
intelligence process for EM, including steps, a flow diagram, and any other key guiding 
principles that appear to be essential for success. If key causal factors can be identified 
and confirmed, a model developed from the aforementioned principles from the IC could 
be translated to the EM community. 
The ideal end result will be a model that is scalable, functional, easily 
implemented, and utilized by any level of government. Groundwork would then be laid 
for better collaboration with the current IC by the EM community, better support to first 
responders during large-scale events, a more proactive role in preventing future disasters, 
and a more robust all-hazards community as a whole. 
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis discusses the use of intelligence in EM, including how the EM 
community can best collaborate with the IC to best support and improve the all-hazards 
approach to incidents. Chapter II reviews current literature on the current uses of 
intelligence in the EM community, including a brief discussion of the term “intelligence” 
to help narrow the focus of the subsequent chapters. The review also looks at the current 
EM-SLFC relationship and identifies both gaps and opportunities moving forward. 
Chapter III addresses the first portion of the research question, determining 
whether there is a need and role for an intelligence process within EM. The role of such a 
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process is compared against the five mission areas of FEMA, and includes a real-life 
example of how EM intelligence was, or could have been used, during an incident. 
Chapter IV discusses current models of the use of intelligence from three different 
perspectives:  the U.S. Military’s Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace process; the 
Federal IC’s intelligence process, focusing primarily on the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI); and finally local jurisdiction’s use of intelligence-led policing tactics. 
A summary of transferrable concepts relevant to the EM community concludes each 
section of the chapter. 
Chapter V presents a model of the use of intelligence of EM based on the best 
practices from the previous chapter. It also includes discussion of field application and 
provides examples of how a proposed Emergency Management Intelligence Cycle could 
be utilized to enhance the overall all-hazards community. 
Chapter VI discusses conclusions and recommendations for integrating the EM 
intelligence model into the existing EM community, as well as offering suggestions for 
overcoming identified obstacles. This chapter summarizes the overall key findings of the 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this review is to summarize current literature that addresses the 
definition of intelligence, the intelligence process, and areas of applicability to the EM 
field. Because this subject is specific to governmental EM and HSE, the scope of the 
literature reviewed was primarily limited to governmental documents, including 
government agencies outside DHS that have established intelligence-gathering processes. 
The review of academic writings was added when warranted and available. The literature 
can be broken down into: 1) literature that focuses on definitions of intelligence and the 
intelligence process; 2) literature that addresses the use (or potential use) of intelligence 
within the EM community; and 3) literature that looks at the EOC-SLFC relationship, the 
primary source of current interaction between the EM and IC.   
B. DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE 
PROCESS 
1. Intelligence  
The concept of intelligence is not new to the homeland security enterprise as 
evidenced by DHS’ inclusion in the IC, as identified by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence’s (ODNI) identified IC.27 However, the lack of its clear application 
to the world of EM necessitates some consideration, and thus establishing commonalities 
amongst the sources will provide a working definition to frame the remainder of this 
review. The base definition used is that of the U.S. Department of Defense from 1998:  
“the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation 
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.”28 
Definitions from various government sources involved in the IC generally agree with this 
premise: the FBI defines intelligence as “information that has been analyzed and refined 
                                                 
27 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, “Members of the Intelligence Community,” 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic. 
28 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 2–02. National Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations,” (September 1998), 12. 
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so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions;”29 and the Central Intelligence 
Agency defines it as “knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us,”30 and 
includes the connection to policymakers. Simplified, it can be depicted in the equation 
“Intelligence= Information + Analysis,”31 is scrutinized to determine or formulate 
meaning and relevance,32 and includes a deliverable of actionable choices and likelihood 
of outcomes.33  It is also often used interchangeably to describe, “product, organization, 
mission, or process.”34  
From a national strategic and operational perspective, there is an effort to define 
the parameters of what can be classified as intelligence, as information gathered on any 
topic and analyzed would not necessarily qualify. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 defines national intelligence as “information gathered in the U.S. 
or abroad that pertains to more than one agency and involves threats to the U.S., its 
people, property or interests…or any other matter bearing on national or homeland 
security.”35  As the HSE moves towards the all-hazards concept, however, the scope of 
intelligence becomes larger and includes: “political, military, scientific and technical, 
economic, sociological, and environmental”36 information. The mission now dictates a 
broader intake of information. 
                                                 
29 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Defined,  http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/intelligence/defined. 
30 Dr. Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence,” (Central Intelligence Agency), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html (accessed October 23, 2012) as cited from Central Intelligence 
Agency (Office of Public Affairs), A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1999), vii. 
31 Canadian Defence Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Analyst Course Textbook (Joint Military 
Intelligence Training Center, 2000), II-4–2. 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice, Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 502: Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination 
(May 2010),  10. 
33 Valerie Lucus-McEwen, “Recalibrating Emergency Management: Information is not the same as 
intelligence,” Emergency Management, December 2010, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-
blogs/campus/Recalibrate-Emergency-Management-Information-Intelligence-122910.html. 
34 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly III, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security:  Supporting the Supporting 
Effort,” U.S. Army War College-Strategy Research Project (April 2002), 11. 
35 United State Government, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” Public 
Law 108–458 of December 17, 2004; 118 STAT.3638, 148. 
36 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security,” 11. 
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From the government documents reviewed for this literature review, there is 
general consensus and acceptance of the general definition of intelligence, with nuances 
attributable to the mission goals of the organization defining it (i.e., the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency includes foreign and secret considerations, as these align with their 
mission). Sources from the academic community vary minimally, and offer that 
intelligence is collected with national welfare in mind,37 and includes secret information 
that is not available in the public domain.38  Dr. Michael Warner, historian with the 
Central Intelligence Agency, asserts that, “without secrets, it is not intelligence” and 
offers the definition of intelligence to be, “secret, state activity to understand or influence 
foreign entities.”39 However, the counter-argument is that intelligence, at its most basic 
level, is simply information that helps you solve a problem and gives you a decision-
making advantage; it is not “secrets.”  Because the model proposed in Chapter IV is not 
reliant on confidential or secret information, the broader, more global context of 
intelligence will be utilized, as the definition of intelligence at this higher level thus 
appears to be fairly standard. 
2. The Intelligence Process 
The process of Intelligence also has generally accepted tenets with minor debate 
limited mainly to semantics amongst government agencies that utilize such a process. 
The Canadian intelligence process includes five key steps:  direction, planning, 
collection, analysis, and dissemination.40  The FBI adds a requirements section to the 
front end of this process, and includes a processing and exploitation step between the 
collection and analysis.41  These fundamental elements are utilized by members of the 
                                                 
37 Warner, Wanted, as cited from Herman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), vii. 
38 Ibid, as cited from Council on Foreign Relations [Richard N. Haass, project director], Making 
Intelligence Smarter: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1996), 8. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Backgrounder No. 3 – CSIS and the Security Intelligence 
Cycle, February 2004, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr03-eng.asp. 
41 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Cycle, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle. 
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U.S. Military (the Air Force’s Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance process, for 
example),42 as well as internationally.43  The entire process is continuous and only 
completed when the needs of the decision maker are met for a given subject or event.44 
At the State level, SLFCs in particular use this process regardless of the mission, the 
disciplines they support, or the types of information they receive.45  Information from the 
academic community supports this process; however, there is an argument for the need 
for action on the intelligence to be included, as evidenced by Mark Lowenthal’s addition 
of an operational component to the end of the intelligence process.46 
3. Information Sharing and Fusion 
In addition to the traditional and somewhat standard use of the term 
“intelligence,” a vernacular for the all-hazards and intelligence communities has 
developed to include terms that are now directly associated with the intelligence process. 
Of most relevance to this course of study are the terms “information sharing,” and 
“fusion.”  In the IC, “information sharing is the act of exchanging intelligence 
information between collectors, analysts, and end users in order to improve national and 
homeland security.”47  Both the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Implementation Act of 2007 mandated 
the IC to revise their methods of dissemination and collaboration to achieve information 
sharing,48 and the proliferation of the term throughout federal all-hazards guidance is 
readily evident. Nearly synonymous with information sharing, the term “fusion” implies 
“dissemination of both raw information and finished intelligence.”49  This term is where 
                                                 
42 U. S. AIR FORCE, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5. In:Command, A. F. D. edited 2002, 5. 
43 Canadian Chief of Defence, Joint Intelligence Doctrine, CF Publication B-GJ-005–200FP-000, May 
2003, 2–4. 
44 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security,” 19. 
45 DHS-DOJ, CPG 502, 9. 
46 Warner, Wanted, as cited from Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002 [second edition]), 8. 
47 ODNI, USIC Information Sharing Strategy,  3. 
48 The Markle Foundation, “Nation At Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the 
Country,” (March 2009), 4. 
49 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security,” 37. 
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SLFCs derive their moniker, as they are hubs of both finished and unfinished information 
products. Both terms are important to the all-hazards community; thus their inclusion in 
this literature review. 
C. LITERATURE ON CURRENT STATUS OF EM-IC OPERATIONS 
What role, if any, is there then for an established process for intelligence 
gathering in the discipline of EM?  If there is general agreement and understanding of the 
definition of intelligence and the process for intelligence gathering and analysis, why 
hasn’t there been a more well-defined and established process for employing it in routine 
operations? With definitions ruled out, a survey of literature on the current relationship 
between the IC and EM is important to further flesh out a potential connection. A review 
of areas of discrepancy and opportunity then follows in the remaining sections of this 
literature review to provide a framework for future considerations.   
1. Intelligence in the HSE 
The literature on the broader IC is exhaustive; in an effort to provide a basis for 
the study and subsequent findings of this project, I will therefore limit the survey of the 
use of intelligence to the HSE, narrowing to the use of intelligence in EM. The U.S. 
DHS, as a member of the U.S. IC, takes its broader objectives and priorities from the 
Director of National Intelligence.50    However, DHS has established its own Intelligence 
Enterprise (DHSI) within the agency composed of three offices/programs (the Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 
(HITRAC), and the Intelligence Division of the Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning), and the “intelligence elements of six operational components: U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Transportation Security Administration 
 
                                                 
50 U.S. Government, IRPTA, 2. 
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(TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS).”51  Noticeably 
absent from this list is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead 
EM agency in the nation.   
Within the DHSI, I&A and the HITRAC provide the greatest connection to the 
EM community. I&A’s mission is to provide intelligence and staff to support DHS-wide 
“operational planning and coordination to support crisis and contingency planning and 
operations to support the Secretary of Homeland Security in his/her HSPD-5 role as the 
principal Federal official for domestic incident management.”52  I&A includes the 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), which provides 
support and leadership to risk analysis and threat assessments in collaboration with state 
and local governments.53  Although these threat assessments are conducted for HS-
identified threats, their potential use by and application to the EM community will be 
discussed in detail below. Also within the DHSI, the HITRAC dually supports the 
Infrastructure Protection and I&A functions of DHS. Specifically, the HITRAC “provides 
timely and integrated risk, threat, and consequence analyses to give the Department and 
its security partners an understanding of threats, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and 
potential consequences of attacks or natural disasters.”54  With the inclusion of natural 
disasters, HITRAC is one of the few DHSI members that expressly mentions the value of 
intelligence to the EM community.  
Moving away from the research on the organizational aspects and towards 
literature supporting the utility of such a function, several potential connections are 
identified. The use of intelligence by EM can be divided into six functions55: 
                                                 
51 Mark A. Randol, “The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise:  Operational 
Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress,” Congressional Research Service 7–5700 (May 27, 
2009), 2–3. 
52 Ibid., 18. 
53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers:  Concept 
of Operations,” (December 2008), p. 12. (Note:  the ITACG has recently been renamed the Joint 
Counterterrorism Assessment Team- JCAT.) 
54 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, About the Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division, 
http://www.dhs.gov/infrastructure-analysis-and-strategy. 
55 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security,”19. 
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• Indications and Warning–Intelligence has been identified to bolster both 
preparedness efforts pre-incident, and well as during the response phase.56 
Because of this, intelligence operations (such as indications and warnings) 
tend to be proactive in nature,57 which directly addresses the EM posture 
problem identified in Chapter I. The indications portion also has 
significant applications to the mitigation phase of disaster preparedness.58  
• Intelligence Preparation (including threat/vulnerability assessments)–one 
of the biggest obstacles to the use of information in EM is volume:  “an 
abundance of threat information from various sources often reaches 
emergency managers in an uncoordinated fashion.”59  The information 
needs to be “selected, interpreted, and acted on;”60 this interpretation is 
what takes place through the intelligence process. Part of this preparation 
phase is accomplished through threat/vulnerability assessments, which 
help jurisdictions identify their high probability, high consequence assets 
and direct resources accordingly. This function would also utilize risk 
analysis capabilities, as the collaboration between HS risk analysts and the 
IC have been identified to be “critical for producing effective threat 
assessments…(for) managing homeland security risk.”61  Currently, this 
function is handled primarily by the Information Analysis Directorate of 
DHS, and includes intelligence provided by other agencies (i.e., FBI, 
CIA).62  At the State and local level, this manifested itself in the Strategic 
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, which has now evolved into the 
Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis.63 
• Situation Development–intelligence is a critical portion of ongoing 
situational awareness, as the cyclical and iterative process of intelligence 
gathering, processing, and producing ensures that incident commanders 
have “the intelligence he actually needs, when he needs it, in order to 
                                                 
56 FEMA, Intelligence/Investigations, 12. 
57 Lt. Col. Patrick Kelly, “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security,” 20. 
58 Keeley Townsend, John P. Sullivan, Thomas Monahan, & and John Donnelly (2010), Intelligence-
led Mitigation, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 7 (1, Article 63), 5. 
59 Howard Bean and Lisa Keranen (2007), The Role of Homeland Security Information Bulletins 
within Emergency Management Organizations:  A Case Study of Enactment, Journal of Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management, 4 (2, Article 6), 4. 
60 Ibid., 5. 
61 David P. Jackson, “Intelligence-Led Risk Management for Homeland Security:  A Collaborative 
Approach for a Common Goal,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 2. 
62 The Honorable Jane Harman, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, July 12, 2012, 2. 
63 John Baker, “Risk Analysis and Intelligence Communities Collaborative Framework,” Homeland 
Security Institute (April 2009), 63. 
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make rapid decisions.”64  Situational analysis is conducted in a ongoing 
manner, and is used to gain a common operating picture for all 
EM/response personnel.65  This intelligence can help make resource 
decisions66 at the EOCs, as well as in the field. Its utility in this function is 
becoming more standardized, as seen by the inclusion of intelligence in 
National Incident Management System Components67, and the use of Intel 
& Analyst Functions at national-level operations centers.68  
• Target Development–once a threat, vulnerability, or risk is identified in 
Function 3 (above), “targets can be appropriately hardened and suspects 
identified while an event is still in its inchoate stage.”69 
• Damage Assessment–the literature is sparse in the use of intelligence in 
damage assessments. DHS’ I&A retains information about CI/KR, 
including private sector information.70  Knowing what exists before an 
incident is key to assessing damage. 
• Force Protection–the literature here, too, is silent, as this function seems to 
apply more to offensive military-type operations. Its application to first 
responders, however, will be discussed more in Chapter IV.   
2. EOC-SLFC Relationship 
Outside of the aforementioned functions, the best source of potential collaboration 
as found in current literature is the EOC/SLFC relationship. Each state and metropolitan 
area has an EOC; the primary function of which is to provide a “physical location where 
information and resources are coordinated to support incident management (on-scene 
operations) activities.71 As of 2011, DHS reported that there are seventy-seven (77) 
SLFCs nationwide,72 primarily found in the same metropolitan areas and within close 
                                                 
64 Keeley Townsend, John P. Sullivan, Thomas Monahan, & and John Donnelly, “Intelligence-led 
Mitigation,” 7. 
65 FEMA, Intelligence/Investigations ,1 
66 Keeley Townsend, John P. Sullivan, Thomas Monahan, & and John Donnelly, “Intelligence-led 
Mitigation,” 6. 
67 FEMA, Intelligence/Investigations, 2–3. 
68 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, About the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, 
http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-operations-coordination-and-planning.  
69 Howard Bean and Lisa Keranen, “The Role of Homeland Security Information Bulletins,” 9. 
70 Mark A. Randol, “The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise,” 5. 
71 DHS-OIG, Relationships, 5. 
72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. 
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range of the metropolitan/State EOC. The SLFCs exist to “promote greater collaboration 
and information sharing among federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement 
entities.”73 They are typically staffed by intelligence, law enforcement, and functional 
professionals who “facilitate the multi-directional flow of timely, accurate, actionable 
‘all-hazard’ information.”74 DHS has established an Office of Operations Coordination 
and Planning that supports SLFC’s by providing “domestic situational awareness of all 
threats and all-hazards, whether man-made or natural.”75 A 2013 report on SLFCs 
indicated that 26% of the SLFCs are collocated with EOCs;76 however, some sources 
surmise that 100% is inevitable as the SLFCs become more firmly established and 
mature77.  
A review of key literature on the EOC-SLFC relationship further shows that the 
potential benefits of a connection between the two has been explored to some degree, 
primarily in government-published documents. Viewed from both an organizational and 
operational standpoint, many sources identified value in a connection due to various 
commonalities in responsibilities and resources. For example, Our National Intelligence 
Strategy doesn’t directly address the EM community, but includes climate change and 
pandemic disease as “transnational forces and trends” that present strategic challenges for 
the IC to address.78  The U.S. Congress has also stressed the importance of EM as being a 
part of the fusion process, as evidenced by EM’s inclusion in the 9/11 Commission 
Report and the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Report.79 Congress has even gone 
so far as to formalize this mandate through the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, requiring 
DHS to establish standards for intelligence products produced within its agency’s 
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purview.80  The ODNI also contains a National Intelligence Emergency Management 
function whose goal is to “lead an integrated and resilient IC enterprise capable of 
sustaining the ‘intelligence cycle’ under any crisis or consequence management event.”81 
Additionally, several federal agencies that contain intelligence components collocate 
those functions with their EM and response operations; the U.S. Department of 
Transportation is an example.82   
The strongest case for a connection between the EM and Intelligence 
communities came from a joint U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS publication 
that established standards for SLFCs, including their links to EOCs:  “The Fusion Center 
provides intelligence to the EOC regarding the disaster or related events (regardless of 
whether the Fusion Center is all-crimes or all-hazards). (P)lans and procedures should 
include how each Fusion Center will support the jurisdiction’s emergency management 
structure during a crisis.”83 
The literature in support of the EOC-SLFC interface also agrees on some common 
competencies that the collaboration should strive for. DHS includes the production of 
threats and risk assessments as a competency both should assist each other in conducting, 
and includes EM in their list of providers of intelligence.84 DHS plays a key role in this 
through both the production of HS Threat Assessment and Intelligence reports on a 
regular basis85 and the deployment of Intelligence Officers and Protective Security 
Advisors to support its partners in the HS regions.86  This federal literature also 
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emphasizes the all-hazards approach, charging SLFC with “identify(ing) and 
prioritize(ing) types of major disasters and emergencies–beyond terrorism and crime-that 
could occur within their jurisdiction.”  
D. AREAS OF DISCREPANCY 
Although the rhetoric is strong in the literature, especially in governmental 
circles, the action in formalizing the EM-IC relationship has been far less thorough 
indicating some disagreement on fundamental issues. The disagreements manifest 
themselves primarily as obstacles to implementation, but also in the lack of significant 
practical progress in overcoming them. DHS’ acknowledges this deficiency, as their 
strategic plan for FY2012–2016, recognizes intelligence as an area needing 
“enhancement.”87  Outside agencies also recognize the lack of information sharing within 
the EM and IC communities; most notably, the 2009 Markle Report identified that the 
task of “ensur(ing) that all government information relevant to national security is 
discoverable and accessible to authorized users,” remained largely “unfinished.”88 
The obstacles identified in the literature primarily fall into two categories:  
securitization of information, and lack of cross-disciplinary training.   Of primary concern 
to the IC is that a greater sharing of information (intelligence) may “compromise source 
confidentiality—a legitimate concern for intelligence gatherers.”89  With a broadened IC 
comes an increase in the number of intelligence requests; this increase could tax existing 
sources of intelligence with an overwhelming number of inquiries, potentially hindering 
their utility. In addition to the confidentiality concerns, the classification of information 
also presents a challenge.  “As long as multiple levels of security continue, isolation and 
duplication will complicate intelligence support to homeland security.”90  The cost in 
both time and effort to maintain such a classification system is somewhat prohibitive to 
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the inclusion of more members. This obstacle is often exacerbated by the training and 
background requirements necessary to handle intelligence properly. Beyond training, 
collaboration between the two communities is further hindered by an absence of cross-
discipline familiarity.91  This obstacle is cyclical, as training creates cross-discipline 
awareness, but without even the basic context for the use of intelligence, it is incredibly 
difficult to work in a peer-to-peer setting without first bringing one discipline up to 
proficiency. 
Turning to the EOC-SFLC relationship, because the literature detailing the 
relationship is somewhat sparse outside of the government realm, some inference could 
be drawn about the strained relationship by what is not addressed directly. No clearer is 
this exemplified than in an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Report on relationships 
between EOCs and SLFCs which found that many SLFCs have designated themselves as 
either “all-crimes” or counterterrorism specific.  “Where Fusion Centers adopt such 
designations (i.e., “all-crimes,” “counterterrorism,” etc.), information sharing with EOCs 
is significantly limited or non-existent.”92  This information directly contradicts a 2012 
report on SLFCs that reported that “92.2% disseminate information to the EOC or 
respective lead EM agency in their area of responsibility.”93 This second number is 
suspect in that it is self-assessed, whereas the OIGs report was an independent review, 
and shows that there is a big disconnect in perception vs. action. In fact, the OIG’s 
investigation found that more than 83% of the locations visited during their fieldwork did 
not receive or were not using Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502,94 nor did DHS 
formally track whether SLFCs have taken an all-crimes or all-hazards approach in their 
operations.95 By inference, the overwhelming majority of SLFCs has chosen willfully to 
ignore these suggestions, or is unaware that a relationship might be beneficial. Even the 
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National Intelligence Strategy, mentioned above, discusses traditional EM 
responsibilities, but never makes mention of the role of EM in our national IC. 
On a more operational level, there is disagreement over the level of cooperation 
needed, with the two opposing views drawn along the EM-IC divide. On the EM side, the 
U.S. DHS and DOJ see a role for intelligence analysts from SLFCs to be available to 
serve as liaisons during an incident with a reciprocal role played by EOCs depending on 
the nature of the event.96  However, proponents in the IC as identified by the OIG report 
hold that the diverse nature of response to and sources of information utilized in these 
varying events would limit the usefulness of such a connection.97  The same is true of the 
suggestion of integrating SLFC personnel to analyze information gather by EOC 
sources,98 as the skill sets required for each are not necessarily compatible according to 
the IC. The OIG report also identified a concern over duplication of resources with EOCs 
if SLFCs were required to be all-hazards.99 
E. AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY 
Because the discussion surrounding the need for and level of coordination 
between EM and the IC is a fairly new debate and dominated by government documents 
heavy in rhetoric (“intelligence coordination is a cornerstone of the HS mission”),100 
many issues remain unconsidered and unresolved as evidenced by substantial gaps in 
literary discourse. For starters, there is a lack of adequate research or clarity on the role of 
the federal government in dictating the parameters of any relationship that could, or 
should, exist. While the nation’s foremost EM agency, FEMA, was moved after 
September 2001 under DHS to “improve coordination and delivery of services after a 
natural disaster or terrorist attack,”101 DHS’s own Intelligence Enterprise does not 
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include FEMA amongst their operational components, an omission that is not clearly 
explained in written form.102  DHS has made strides recently in acknowledging this 
deficiency, primarily in their EOC-SLFC guidance. DHS has even gone so far as to 
pledge support to “continue to develop mechanisms to more effectively identify 
opportunities to collaborate to include the Fire Service, Public Health, and Emergency 
Management.”103 
The literature reviewed for this thesis was also surprisingly thin on real-world 
examples of collaborative efforts, including best practices. Despite the generally accepted 
notion that a relationship could exist and could be mutually beneficial, most examples 
that were given were one-sided and of such a small scale that they could be written off to 
coincidence. If the relationship should exist and is beneficial, surely a more robust set of 
examples and best practices should be available. Although there is a chance that this 
relationship is still in its infancy and thus examples are forthcoming, a lack of concrete 
examples betrays the suggested importance of a link. A discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each community and direct lessons each could learn from the other would 
be helpful in advancing the concept. 
A final glaring omission from the literature was a discussion on tried and true 
methods for information collection, analysis, and dissemination that could be applicable 
to and functional for EM. With some minimal effort, the application of the intelligence 
cycle to the EM process can be developed and followed. Part of the challenge that exists 
in establishing common ground between EM and the IC, and more specifically EOCs and 
SLFCs, exists in semantics; however, the remainder of the translation will require some 
effort. For instance, the process of analysis is clearly defined and implemented in the IC 
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culture will be required to support the all-hazards community and concept from “need-to-
know” to “need-to-share.”104  It will require the IC to move to a “‘responsibility to 
provide’ (model) to ensure all members of the Community can retrieve the information 
they need and effectively support intelligence customers.”105 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
A review of the literature on the relationship between EM and the IC has revealed 
a substantial amount of discourse on the topic. However, a consensus has yet to be 
reached, and accordingly minimal progress has been made. With a concerted effort to 
further explore the strengths and benefits of a partnership, including standardization of 
roles and responsibilities, a more robust HS & EM enterprise could emerge. Chapters III-
V will explore this concept more fully, and provide recommendations for just such a IC-
EM collaborative model.   
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III. NEED FOR AND ROLE OF AN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
Listen, S-2, the colonel said, I don’t care about how many inches of 
rainfall to expect. I don’t care about the percentage of lunar illumination. 
I don’t want lots of facts and figures. Number one, I don’t have time, and 
number two they don’t do me any good. What I need is to know what it all 
means.106 
This chapter directly addresses the first two portions of the Research Question:  is 
there a role for intelligence in EM, and if so what role could it play?    The first part of 
this will be answered through a framework directly related to the all-hazards goals of 
collaboration, greater efficiency, and an improved HSE posture. The second portion will 
be addressed through FEMA’s five mission areas, and provide examples of how a 
formalized intelligence process would function in EM. 
A. EM INTELLIGENCE ROLE THROUGH ALL-HAZARDS FRAMEWORK 
1. Collaboration 
Collaboration without shared goals is frivolous and pointless; however, when 
there is a natural fit and something to be gained, collaboration is a worthwhile endeavor. 
Such a natural fit exists between the IC and EM communities, yet hasn’t been explored to 
its fullest. Although an intelligence process within EM has far-reaching benefits solely 
within the EM field, the benefits of connecting resources, processes, and personnel from 
the multiple disciplines and agencies are greater in depth and quantity.   
Collaboration, in order to be mutually beneficial, requires each partner to bring a 
capability to the table that creates the win-win situation. Additionally, it requires 
structure: “Assuming that agencies have an incentive to cooperate, they can only do so 
successfully with the proper infrastructure.”107  Because EM doesn’t have an intelligence 
process, this collaboration infrastructure is crippled by a lack of common capability 
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within the EM community. An EM intelligence process would allow for a common 
language and understanding that would enable both parties to communicate in an 
expeditious fashion and generate comprehensive products that all sides can understand, 
interpret and utilize. This includes information, such as assessments on CI/KR and 
Hazardous Materials reporting, that would be beneficial for the two to share and 
collaborate on. 
Moving from theoretical to practical, as one of the primary end goals of an EM 
intelligence process is to foster greater collaboration between the EM and Intelligence 
communities, multi-discipline partnerships are key. Beginning with the SLFC-EOC 
relationship, the traditional EM-Fire-Police network is expanded to connect to resources 
such as the Terrorism Liaison Officer program and relevant information held within the 
SLFC walls. From there, this formalized process would allow the EM community to 
connect into broader communities, such as the National Guard, locally-based Federal 
resources, and Federal IC agencies when necessary. It would even expand into private 
industry, as an established intelligence process would only amplify the quantity and 
quality of information that is gathered through existing partnerships between EM and the 
private sector, processed by EM intelligence analysts, and shared amongst the broader IC. 
In a State such as Arizona, for example, where the security of our southern border is a 
multi-discipline, multi-jurisdiction, multi-sector concern, this strategy could help 
integrate the EM community and its resources into the fold to assist in developing 
solutions.  
This collaboration amongst the HSE and expansion of the use of intelligence 
would also align with the National Intelligence Strategy of 2009. Three of the enterprise 
objectives presented in the Strategy are to 1) build familiarity of the IC and its 
capabilities; 2) expand partnerships; and 3) establish new partnerships.108  EM, as an all-
hazard partner, would be a logical partnership for the IC, and by establishing a formalized 
intelligence process better support the missions of the overall HSE. 
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2. Resource Efficiency 
A formalized intelligence process would also help the all-hazards approach in 
creating a more efficient HSE. Currently, duplications exist in equipment and personnel 
who are tasked with identical roles and responsibilities in all phases of an incident, but 
are siloed within their respective communities. By incrementally increasing the purview 
of an EM intelligence community, the HSE as a whole would be able to eliminate 
redundancy and increase efficiency. As an example, threat assessments are currently 
conducted on Critical Infrastructure by the IC for terrorist events; assessing them for 
vulnerability to floods, earthquakes, or tornadoes might have substantial overlap, and 
could therefore be conducted by one similar sized team with representatives from EM 
and the IC, rather than two separate and distinct teams. Similar overlaps occur in the 
collection and analysis of data for tactical purposes (i.e., routes of ingress/egress, 
damages post-event, etc.). There are obviously areas of specialty, as well, that do not 
necessitate a complete integration of the EM community and IC. However, in those areas 
where resources overlap, it makes sense to collaborate and share the tasking and resulting 
intelligence to maximize resource efficiency. 
Greater efficiency could also result from an EM intelligence process that aided the 
resource allocation process. This is particularly evident at the State level, where EOCs 
and SLFCs provide support to the same agencies and departments, and have the ability to 
coordinate or request many of the same resources. In these instances, “decisions on 
operational priorities and resource allocations (often) depend on receiving tailored threat 
judgments from intelligence analysts.”109 Without an equivalent capability within EM, 
there is no voice to advocate on behalf of EM needs in a manner that adheres to objective 
criteria and an “apples-to-apples” measurement. Instead, the allocation is left to the IC, 
who may or may not have a solid understanding of the EM need to make an informed, 
comprehensive. An intelligence process within EM levels the playing field and enables 
greater efficiency in resource allocation.   This ability to conduct a standardized risk 
assessment capable of examining and comparing dissimilar events (such as Hazardous 
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Materials transportation, earthquakes and terrorism hazards) illustrates a “common 
framework that a decision-maker can use to compare risks threatening a region.”110  From 
there, decision-makers can make well informed decisions and establish priorities for both 
personnel and resources. This capability currently does not exist. 
Finally, efficiency could also be realized in the dramatic reduction of information 
decision-makers are presented with during both steady state and EOC activations. With 
the inclusion of Intelligence and Information Sharing as a core capability within the 
NPG,111 DHS has recognized the importance of information sharing amongst the all-
hazards community, and also that there is a need to compartmentalize and pare down the 
information and intelligence that a practitioner is seeing. With information flowing into 
the EOC from all angles, an intelligence process is needed to whittle that information 
down to a product that allows for efficient review and decision-making. This is especially 
problematic for the IC and EM communities when it comes to comprehensive threat 
assessments for high-ranking officials.  “Some threats, such as terrorism, are new to 
governors but familiar to intelligence officers, but most of the threats facing a governor—
blackouts, floods, hurricanes—are familiar to (governors) but new to intelligence 
officers.”112 In order to develop a single, integrated assessment, EM must have an ability 
to generate an intelligence product that can be submitted alongside the IC’s in order to 
support efficient decision-making. 
3. Posture of EM 
A well-defined, formalized intelligence process within EM would also allow for a 
greater proactive posture in preparing and mitigating for incidents. Rather than focusing 
on response capabilities, an intelligence process would give decision-makers the 
necessary analysis required to make resource allocations and establish priorities that 
would swing the focus to more preventative measures. Although planning is a standard 
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across the EM community, the planning process alone does not translate into 
preparedness. For example, in a survey conducted of counties nationwide, 90% of 
counties have an emergency operations plan, yet only 42% felt that their agency was 
adequately prepared for a disaster.113  Plans alone are insufficient for developing and 
maintaining a proactive approach to preparedness for disasters. 
Nowhere is our current reactive posture greater exemplified than in federal 
spending for preparedness vs. recovery activities. In Federal fiscal year 2013, State and 
local and first responder grants received about $2.5 billion;114 these grants are spread 
amongst FEMA’s five mission areas, but would ideally constitute the majority of funds 
used for proactive posturing. However, a 2009 study of the allocation of these funds by 
state and local agencies showed the distribution to be 14.1% on Prevention, 13.2% on 
Protection, 32.8% on Response, .6% on Recovery, and 39.3% on developing a capability 
that spanned all four areas.115  Thus, the majority of these funds are indeed spent on 
reactive measures, not a proactive posturing. 
In contrast, $7 billion was allocated to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) in 
FY2013116, the overwhelming majority of which goes towards Recovery efforts, a 
portion to Response activities, and a minimal amount to mitigation.   For example, the to-
date totals for DRF allocations to Hurricane Sandy show that the total funding designated 
to the overall relief efforts is $8.4 billion. Of that, the total currently designated for 
mitigation is $111 million,117 or 1.3% of the total allocation. Again, the reactive posture 
of our current EM community is reflected in these expenditures. 
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The foundation for a proactive posture exists in high-quality data sets and models 
for assessing threat and vulnerability, as well as partnerships118 with subject matter 
experts from FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the National Weather 
Service, U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Interior, the U.S. Forest Service, and 
many others. However, without a formalized iterative intelligence process for EM, these 
partnerships are not utilized to their fullest capacity, and proactive measures aren’t at the 
forefront of EM priorities. The data and resources exist; the intelligence process 
necessary to convert these into products and support decision-makers does not. Integrated 
with intelligence from outside partners, conclusions drawn from the EM intelligence 
community would be a substantial asset in determining preparedness priorities.119 
B. EM INTELLIGNECE ROLE THROUGH FEMA MISSION AREAS 
FRAMEWORK 
If the EM community were to implement a process for intelligence gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination, what role would it play within EM and the all-hazards 
community at large?  The NPG established five mission areas (prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery)120 that set the national standard for federal, state, 
local, and tribal EM programs. As such, any intelligence process that would be 
considered for the EM community would be most readily integrated if it fit within this 
mission area framework and augmented the 31 core capabilities within each.121  Of these 
31, the core capabilities of Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational 
Coordination span all five mission areas, and are directly relevant to EM responsibilities. 
The following analysis shows how such an EM intelligence process fits well within each 
mission area, including the core capabilities, and provides a real-world example where 
intelligence was, or could have been, utilized to bolster EM’s current capabilities.  
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1. Prevention 
The Prevention mission area “comprises the capabilities necessary to avoid, 
prevent, or stop”122 an act that threatens the safety of UC citizens or critical 
infrastructure. Although the prevention mission is mainly focused on the prevention of 
terrorist acts, the proliferation of all-hazards has softened this to include prevention of 
losses due to natural disasters. The prevention mission includes an Intelligence and 
Information Sharing core capability intended to bolster and support the all-hazards 
community’s ability to collect and share key information and analysis across impacted 
partners.   
An intelligence process for EM would primarily be used within the prevention 
mission for assessing the risk of an event that could potentially occur. These risk 
assessments could span specific impacts to key facilities/areas for a specific event, or 
include broader topics such as climate change, changing demographics within a target 
location, or the interdependency of systems within a geographic location (i.e., 
water/electrical systems).123  With this intelligence in hand, planning could either 
consider preventative measures when possible, or assess their own capability to respond 
to such an event and prepare measures to address anything that is beyond their ability to 
handle.124  Intelligence also provides situational awareness, or “the process of 
recognizing a threat at an early stage and taking measures to avoid it.”125 Situational 
awareness according to such a definition closely mirrors the goal of the prevention 
mission, and can provide adequate warning to implement preventative measures.  
a. Prevention Exampl—Hurricane Sandy  
A prime example of the effective use of intelligence to support the 
prevention mission recently came to light in the wake of 2012’s Hurricane Sandy that 
devastated the eastern coast of the United States. As the storm hit shore, the community 
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of Stamford, Connecticut, sat comfortably behind a seventeen-foot storm wall that had 
been activated and raised from the sea floor126 two days prior in response to reports that a 
storm surge was imminent.   The wall had been constructed by the USACE in 1969, and 
helped prevent about $25 million in damage to businesses and homes during the Sandy 
event.127  The original cost of construction was $15 million, but has been utilized in 
hundreds of storms and tidal surges in the past forty-four years, preventing much more in 
response and recovery costs. In light of the Hurricane Irene and Sandy events, calls have 
been made for a feasibility study to be completed by the USACE128 (in conjunction with 
scientists and engineers familiar with the concept) to see if additional walls could be 
completed in other vulnerable areas of the eastern seaboard. This type of prevention 
effort would not have been possible without a thorough process of inquiry and informed 
decision-making that was based on collaboration of multiple disciplines and agencies. 
This decision-making depended on information and analysis—intelligence—and similar 
successes could be achieved through replicating this process. 
2. Protection 
The Protection mission area addresses the “the capabilities necessary to secure the 
homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade, or natural disasters.”129  The Protection 
area is primarily concerned with physical and technological security measures that reduce 
vulnerability and accessibility to CI/KR. Although this mission has the least overlap with 
the EM community, the core capabilities of Physical Protective Measures and Risk 
Management are areas prime for collaborative opportunities with the IC. The Protection 
mission area includes an Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability, where an 
EM intelligence process could integrate into and support the overall mission.   
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a. Protection Example–Hurricane Katrina Flood Maps  
Although the lack of a formalized intelligence process often impacts 
critical infrastructure and key resources, it can also lead to an uniformed policy decision 
that greatly impacts the EM community and the tax-paying citizen. One such example 
from the Protection mission area occurred in Louisiana parishes impacted by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. As part of the multi-year recovery efforts, FEMA published preliminary 
flood maps used in determining risk in areas with non-federal systems.130  However, 
when they were published maps contained errors and failed to incorporate local flood 
protection measures such as “non-accredited levees and pump stations that were 
promised to be part of the formula creating preliminary maps.”131  In the community, the 
issuance of these maps caused “heightened anxiety”132 for residents concerned that the 
findings in these maps could affect their eligibility or premiums for the National Flood 
Insurance Program. On a broader scale, though, the proliferation throughout the federal 
EM system of maps that failed to indicate or consider localized protection measures 
could have devastating consequences. The lack of foresight to include these in official 
maps, as well as the message it would communicate to the general public in the impacted 
area, could had been resolved with a more careful analysis. 
3. Mitigation 
The prevention and protection missions are intended to eliminate the threat or 
effects of a terrorist attack or natural disaster; Mitigation efforts comprise “the 
capabilities necessary to reduce the loss of life and property by lessening the impact”133 
of an inevitable disaster. DHS and FEMA recognize that some disasters are unavoidable 
(i.e., natural disasters), and therefore include as part of their overall mission the goal of 
reducing the impact of incidences that do occur.134  The Mitigation mission area is where 
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the majority of EM’s proactive measures take place, as vulnerabilities are identified and 
addressed through various means of reducing said vulnerabilities. The savings recognized 
by these measures are not only monetary, but also in both an increased public safety and 
corresponding first responder safety. An EM intelligence process would directly support 
the core capabilities of Community Resilience, Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction, Risk 
and Disaster Resilience, and Threat and Hazard Identification. Through the formalized 
process of collection, analysis, and generation of intelligence, areas of concern can be 
identified and decision makers charged with implementing mitigation strategies can 
determine priorities accordingly. 
a. Mitigation Example–Post-Schultz Fire Flooding  
Numerous studies have been conducted over the years showing the 
beneficial impacts of mitigation efforts. One such study was conducted on the costs 
associated with Arizona’s Schultz Fire and subsequent Post-Fire Flooding that caused 
significant damage to private and public property in 2010. The Schultz Fire burned over 
15,000 acres in a heavily sloped area, and was followed shortly thereafter by heavy 
seasonal monsoon rains. Although efforts were made to put mitigation measures in place, 
the community was largely overwhelmed and underprepared for the flooding off the 
burned slopes. Through a comprehensive survey of both public and private sources, the 
report concluded that “by treating a significant portion of the Schultz Fire imprint with an 
investment of $15 million could have greatly reduced the cost of the Schultz Fire and 
avoided the damage and loss of life associated with post-fire flooding that is now 
conservatively estimated to be between $133 and $147 million.”135 The damage to 
infrastructure could have been substantially mitigated if the problem was addressed 
immediately through a formalized process. Additionally, if the problem was identified 
and disseminated as a stronger warning to the public through channels established as part 
of an intelligence process, the loss of life may also have been mitigated.  
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The Response mission area encompasses “the capabilities necessary to save lives, 
protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has 
occurred.”136  Response operations go beyond lights and sirens, and include 
transportation, environmental, health, and mass care considerations. These non-tactical 
decisions fall under the purview of EM, and an intelligence process within EM could 
greatly expedite the decision making process for these key issues that affect life and 
safety both during and immediately following an incident. During the ongoing event, the 
EOC is a key focal point for information sharing and gathering, as it provides a “structure 
for needed support for executive decision making.”137  Information alone is not adequate, 
however, as the volumes of information that flow into an EOC need to be collected, 
analyzed, and shared to the right people in a timely fashion138 to support these decision-
making processes.  
Decisions during the response phase typically fall into the tactical or operational 
levels, although they could simultaneously be formed for long-term strategic goals. From 
a tactical perspective, receiving intelligence updates during an incident helps, “ascertain 
changes in the operational environment and make appropriate tactical and safety 
decisions.”139  This intelligence would provide responders with key information that isn’t 
readily available in the field, such as near-term weather conditions, location of key 
infrastructure, and prioritized impact areas. The Response mission includes the core 
capabilities of Critical Transportation, Environmental Response/Health and Safety, 
Fatality Management Services, Mass Care Services, Public and Private Services and 
Resources, Public Health and Medical Services, Situational Assessment, all of which the 
EM community plays a primary or support role in addressing. 
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a. Response Examples–North Carolina Division of Emergency 
Management and Novato Fire 
Two examples of Response actions that were aided through the use of 
intelligence are warranted showcasing two of the IC’s newer capabilities:  Geospatial 
Intelligence (GEOINT) from Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT) from Social Media. GIS is widely used in EOCs and provides 
visual displays of information that can range from weather conditions to the location of 
deployed resources.140 The North Carolina Division of EM utilized GIS capabilities as a 
part of their response to flooding caused by Tropical Storm Nicole in September of 2010. 
Once the EOC was activated, North Carolina Division of EM utilized their “intelligence 
map viewer to display real-time National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association weather 
alerts feeds pertaining to the weather conditions including rain fall totals and flooding 
numbers.”141  From a utilization of intelligence in the response phase, the interactive 
nature of the maps provided North Carolina Division of EM leadership with accurate and 
updated information142 at any point in the response effort without having to comb 
through piles of data. The data was already collected, validated, and processed into a 
working intelligence product that was able to incorporate new information as it was 
gathered. 
A second example of the use of intelligence during Response operations 
includes the use of Social Media during an active incident. The following timeline from 
the Fourmile Canyon Fire in Boulder, Colorado shows the speed and role of social media 
for EM operations143: 
• 10:07AM–Fire begins in wildland-urban interface near Boulder 
• 11:34AM–An unaffiliated citizen begins a Twitter feed related to 
the fire 
                                                 
140 North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, “Situational Intelligence Maps Add Value 
During Emergencies,” MEMO Publication 4 (Issue 11) November 2010, 1. 
141 Ibid., 1. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Adapted from Eric D. Nickel, “Collective Intelligence in Emergency Management:  Social Media’s 
Emerging Role in the Emergency Operations Center, “ Novato Fire District, 
www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo45101.pdf, 24–26. 
 41 
• 11:35AM–A second unaffiliated citizen begins Tweeting fire 
dispatch info  
• 1:17PM–A third unaffiliated citizen begins uploading fire 
movement and public safety information onto Google Maps 
• 2:32PM–The City of Boulder begins posting information on their 
Department Facebook site 
• 3:23–5:41PM–The Boulder County Sheriff’s Office initiates the 
use of their Reverse 911 calling system; the software fails and 
none of the calls go through. Messages are pushed out to the public 
through various methods pointing people to the evacuation 
information being posted on the Office’s website and social media 
sites. 
The use of social media was a valuable means as both a collection point 
and a source to disseminate incident information out to the community. Its real-time 
nature and low cost to operate and monitor make it a feasible tool to capitalize on for 
OSINT. A formalized EM intelligence process would help expedite the processing of 
such information into a useable product, and greatly enhance response operations. 
5. Recovery 
The Recovery mission area spans “the core capabilities necessary to assist 
communities affected by an incident to recover effectively.”144 Recovery efforts from a 
disaster can vary based on scope and severity of the damage caused by the event. 
However, the challenge in all recovery efforts is to determine the best course of action 
given the limited resources, and whether or not damaged infrastructure (including homes) 
should be repaired to its pre-disaster condition or potentially relocated out of harms way. 
These decisions, spanning from tactical to strategic, would be supported by intelligence 
gathered pre-, during, and post-event. Examples of intelligence-fed recovery decisions 
would be:  ideal locations for shelters & service centers, routes for ingress/egress for 
humanitarian aid,145 and broader social and economic concerns (key cultural/historical 
sites). It would also include the security concerns that disasters present (i.e., registered 
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sexual offenders in shelters and short-term housing), which could be vastly improved 
through the sharing of intelligence between the IC and EM community. The Recovery 
mission spans the Economic Recovery, Health and Social Services, Housing, 
Infrastructure Systems, and Natural and Cultural Resources core capabilities, all of which 
EM plays a role in supporting or coordinating. 
a. Recovery Example–Whole Community   
The recovery mission could be supported by a formalized intelligence 
through which the pace and scope of efforts are determined. The communities of 
Northwood, North Dakota, and Greensburg, Kansas, had several key decisions to make in 
the aftermath of devastating tornadoes.146  Determining priorities amongst the damage 
(i.e., homes, businesses, municipal buildings, schools, recreation facilities), deciding how 
best to incorporate mitigation efforts, and then bringing the necessary resources to the 
table is a daunting task. However, through the use of a process of inquiry akin to the 
intelligence cycle, information was collected, vetted, analyzed, and a course ahead was 
determined.147  The process was successful due not only to thorough and deliberate 









                                                 
146 Christine Becker, “Disaster Recovery: A Local Government Responsibility,” ICMA Public 
Management Magazine 91 (Number 2) March 2009, http://webapps.icma.org/pm/9102/. 
147 Ibid. 
 43 
IV. INTELLIGENCE MODELS 
In order for the EM community to be able to integrate with the IC in a manner 
that most effectively supports the all-hazards concept, it is imperative that EM learns the 
premises of intelligence to establish a common understanding and language. Although 
intelligence is fundamentally a “information + analysis” equation, the methods by which 
it is gathered and utilized varies between military, federal, and local members of the IC. 
Because these methods are well refined and have proven their worth over years of use, it 
behooves EM to consider aspects of each to develop a model that best suits the mission 
and responsibility of EM. This chapter will thus review three intelligence processes 
utilized by different members of the IC, representing two levels of government and three 
distinct mission areas. Each section will begin with an overview of the intelligence 
process as practiced by the agency/agencies in question, and conclude with a brief 
summary of the transferrable concepts to EM. The transferrable concepts will form the 
basis for the EM Model presented in Chapter V and include an expanded analysis of their 
utility and application. 
A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION–INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
The United States FBI is an “intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national 
security organization with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities.”148  
Although it functions on a global basis, the FBI is highly active domestically and is a key 
point of interaction between the local law enforcement community and the national IC. In 
addition to their well-documented intelligence process, this connection to both the 
national and local intelligence community (including a lead role in SLFCs) makes them a 
good subject for this research study. A review of the FBI’s intelligence process is a good 
step towards establishing common understanding and language with a primary player in 
domestic intelligence. 
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The FBI’s intelligence process follows a broad process of inquiry, production, and 
dissemination termed the “Intelligence Cycle.” (Figure 1)  The cycle includes six steps, is 
not necessarily linear in fashion, and is indicative that the process continues on an 
ongoing basis. This cycle is the process by which the FBI actively collaborates with both 
internal external partners to develop raw data and information into finished products for 
use in both tactical and strategic operations.149 
 
Figure 1.  FBI’s Intelligence Cycle150 
1. The Six Steps of the FBI’s Intelligence Cycle 
a. Step One–Requirements 
The first step of the FBI’s intelligence cycle is the establishment of 
identified information needs (requirements) that can be either generic or specific in 
nature. These requirements are established by the ODNI according to guidance from the 
president, national homeland security advisors, the attorney general, and internally from 
FBI leadership.151  This step essentially defines the “what” of the inquiry; what the 
                                                 
149 FBI, Intelligence Cycle. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid.  
 45 
subject of the inquiry is and what types of information are required for the policy maker 
who will be responsible for the ultimate decision on course of action. It is high level, and 
outlines overarching parameters including longevity of study.   
A key part of this step is deciding what type of analysis is being requested. 
The FBI (and IC in general) generates intelligence that falls into three categories:   
• Current Analysis–time-sensitive intelligence reporting, usually 
concerning a recent event or action on newly discovered 
information.152  It addresses an issue of immediate concern, and 
typically requires quick movement through the intelligence cycle 
for action on a short timeline. 
• Trend Analysis–this is the mid-range intelligence requirement. It 
requires information on an event or series of events, and includes 
background information, an assessment of the reliability of the 
intelligence, and information on similar events to give the decision 
maker context.153 
• Long-Term Assessments–this requirement allows for cultivation of 
information and comprehensive research on on-going issues, future 
trends or developments, or topics in a much broader context.154  
Although these assessments can be done on a short timeline, they 
are typically given a longer time line to allow for more 
comprehensive intelligence gathering. 
b. Step Two–Planning and Direction 
Once the requirement for the intelligence analysis is established and the 
parameters are clear, this step develops the methods of inquiry and the management of 
the entire effort.155  Step one establishes the framework; Step two fills in the details with 
specific collection techniques, time windows for individual deliverables, and resources 
that will be essential to develop the final product.  
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A key aspect of Step two is determining what type of intelligence product 
is most appropriate given the requirement, as well as who is best suited to conduct the 
intelligence collection and analysis (Steps three and four). The National Counterterrorism 
Center’s ITACG, which includes the FBI, categorizes finished intelligence products into 
five categories156: 
• Current–day-to-day events and new developments; short-term 
• Estimative–similar to the long-term assessment described above, 
these includes multiple scenarios and probabilities of occurrence 
• Warning–identifying or forecasting events that are likely to occur 
based on current information and trends; includes low 
probability/high impact events157 
• Research–supports both 1) and 2), but includes a much broader 
range of source material 
• Scientific and Technical–requires the inclusion of technical experts 
who can assess the information from a scientific or technological 
perspective (i.e., Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 
Explosion events or capabilities). 
Once the majority of the planning and direction phase is fleshed out, 
resources are then put in place to begin the actual intelligence gathering process. 
Of Note:  Some researchers on the topic of intelligence combine Steps 
One and Two into a single step and show the sixth step as “continuous evaluation.”158  
For purposes of this study, the process as articulated by the FBI is more appropriate and 
thus utilized. The sole reason for mention of this alternative process is to illustrate that 
although the naming convention utilized by other members of the USIC may be different, 
their conceptual scope is identical. 
c. Step Three–Collection 
The Collection step is where the gathering of raw information based on the 
parameters established in Steps One and Two begins. The collection can draw upon 
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multiple sources as dictated both by the direction of management and needs of the study. 
The ODNI categorizes these sources into the following disciplines (INTs): 
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)–intelligence collected in this 
discipline comes from the interception of communications from or 
to the subject of inquiry, regardless of the method of 
communication. This discipline includes communications 
intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and 
foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FSINT).159  The U.S. 
National Security Agency is the primary federal agency 
responsible for SIGINT collection and cultivation. 
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)–IMINT comes from photographs, 
radar, or any other method utilized to gain a visual representation 
of the subject of study. It is gathered primarily from surveillance 
and satellite imagery, but can also be gathered from more 
advanced technological means, such as electro-optics.160  The U.S. 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the primary federal 
agency responsible for IMINT collection and cultivation. 
• Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)–MASINT is 
“technically derived intelligence”161 that comes from sources other 
than IMINT or SIGINT. This discipline is highly scientific, and 
includes such fields of expertise as seismology, materials 
engineering, and nuclear/chemical/environmental studies. The 
collection of air, water, and soil samples would be examples of 
intelligence that is collected in MASINT. The U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency houses the primary federal directorate 
responsible for MASINT collection and cultivation. 
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)–this discipline includes 
intelligence that is gathered from human sources, whether overtly 
or clandestinely. HUMINT is collected through interviews, 
documents, surveillance, photographs of human subjects, or 
diplomatic methods.162  The Central Intelligence Agency is the 
federal agency most often associated with HUMINT collection. 
• Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)–OSINT is “publicly available 
information appearing in print or electronic form including radio, 
television, newspapers, and the Internet.”163  With the advent and 
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rapid proliferation of social media in the past decade, OSINT has 
become a wealth of information that is freely and readily acquired, 
although it does require a greater degree of validation. As such, 
OSINT is used by most agencies within the IC, although the lead 
agencies for U.S. OSINT are the DNI’s Open Source Center and 
the National Air and Space Intelligence Center.164 
• Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)–GEOINT is the “analysis and 
visual representation of security related activities on the earth.”165  
It is closely related to IMINT, and is even represented as a part of 
IMINT in some discussions of the disciplines.166  Recent 
innovations in GEOINT allows for greater capabilities than simple 
2-D images; terrain maps and 3-D depictions are now 
commonplace. 
• Although the FBI does not utilize all of these disciplines for each 
product it develops, it has these capabilities either in house or at 
their disposal from a partner agency. 
d. Step Four–Processing and Exploitation 
Step four in the FBI’s intelligence process organizes the raw data and 
identifies additional needs for information. The intent is to convert the information into a 
form that will enable analysts to use it, whether through databases or non-automated 
means. This step includes the use of methods like decryption, language translations, and 
data reduction.167  If gaps in the information are detected through preliminary evaluation, 
a loop back to Step Three may be warranted either prior to or concurrently with a move 
to Step Five. This step is critical in situations where the information is voluminous, as 
data can be grouped or culled down to the essentials for the analysts, and subsequently 
the decision makers.  
e. Step Five–Analysis and Production 
Step five is the hinge point of the entire process, where information is 
converted into intelligence. Data that is processed as part of Step Four is given to an 
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analyst where a four–step sub-step process168 takes place to synthesize the information 
into a final product: 
• Evaluation–information is appraised for credibility, relevance, and 
usefulness 
• Analysis–identifying key facts and relationships within the 
information 
• Integration–assembling the analysis into a single, cohesive picture 
• Interpretation–determining the significance of the picture 
generated in the integration step and postulating implications 
The final product provides both context and implications for review by the 
ultimate decision makers.   
As part of this step, it is important to clarify the limitations of intelligence 
products in order to manage the expectations of consumer. Intelligence can provide 
warnings of potential threats, insight into key current events, situational awareness, and 
support to long-term strategic decision-making efforts.169  It cannot predict the future, 
although it can provide solid assessments of likely scenarios170 given the intelligence. 
This is crucial for policy makers to understand, as the intelligence in some cases can be 
unclear or inconclusive. 
f. Step 6–Dissemination 
The final step in the FBI’s intelligence cycle is the distribution of the 
product to the policy makers who initiated the request, as well as others within the HSE 
whose mission includes the subject matter if warranted. The FBI publishes their products 
in three standard formats:  Intelligence Information Reports, Intelligence Bulletins, and 
Intelligence Assessments.171  Outside of the FBI, other IC agencies’ intelligence products 
include Threat Assessments,172 memorandums, technical analyses, research studies, and 
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situational reports.173  These products vary in their scope of study, frequency of 
dissemination, and level of analysis, based on the needs identified in Step one. 
2. Transferrable Concepts to EM 
At its most basic level, the intelligence cycle utilized by the FBI is directly 
relevant to the EM community as a method of inquiry and analysis. Without any 
formalized or standardized method currently in use, gaps in information, validation, and 
analysis are inevitable. Although the requirements can be clear from a broad perspective, 
the expectations of the end-user may be unrealistic in both level of analysis and type of 
outcome. Establishing a formalized process, such as the one utilized by the FBI, allows 
for consistency in expectations and quality of products, as the parameters are determined 
at the outset. It also increases professionalism of the analyst who has a clearer picture of 
the resources at his/her disposal, and the process by which to go through to achieve the 
desired end product. 
Additionally, although the categorization of methods of collection is of little 
benefit in and of itself, the cultivation of resources and partners within these categories 
could prove widely useful. The understanding of available sources of information greatly 
expedites the acquisition of key data that can help the decision-making process within the 
EM community. By adopting a system similar to the INTs, EM can develop relationships 
in these areas to rely on when an event requires information in these areas of expertise. 
These sources may also have intelligence products already developed, and with a 
common understanding and language, would be beneficial to EM in all phases of an 
event. A more comprehensive discussion of the use of INTs in EM is included in Chapter 
IV. 
B. UNITED STATES ARMY–INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE 
BATTLESPACE 
The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) doctrine utilized by the 
United States Army is a “systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and the 
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environment.”174 Through a simple, repeatable four-step cycle, IPB helps prepare a set of 
operational objectives that support overarching missions.175 IPB reduces uncertainty 
about threats,176 provides situational awareness of the area of operations (AO), and 
provides essential information to the commander for purposes of planning courses of 
action (COA). It also aids in developing intelligence collection plans,177 determining the 
allocation178 and placement179 of resources, and in synchronizing staff members to a 
common mission, and understanding of objectives.180  As a point of reference, IPB relates 
to the second phase of the FBI’s intelligence cycle, as it identifies “facts and assumptions 
about the environment and priority intelligence requirements.”181 
IPB is useful in both scalable and flexible, and is useful in multiple planning 
levels and scenarios. The U.S. Army’s military intelligence (including IPB) has three 
levels: 
• Tactical–focused on short-term actions (strikes); can be highly specific in 
scope182 
• Operational–focused on larger scale endeavors (battles); considers 
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• Strategic–long-term, comprehensive assessments of an enemy’s overall 
“capabilities, capacities, and intentions,”184 but not necessary at the time 
of war or conflict. 
The IPB model is composed of four steps (Figure 2) each intended to be a part of 
a cyclical process. The first two phases look outside the organization to the 
environmental conditions of the intended AO; the second two phases focus on the 
anticipated enemy to “uncover sources of strengths and vulnerabilities.”185 The IPB 
process can be conducted by a team of analysts or a single trained individual; this entity 
dictates the collection of information and simultaneous analysis186 to ensure it is 
delivered to the commander in an appropriate time frame. It also includes a feedback loop 
whereby all participants in the operation are trained in “casual observation skills and 
brief/debrief prior to and after each mission.”187  This ensures that prior assumptions are 
validated or negated and new information is constantly and readily available. 
 
Figure 2.  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Steps188 
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1. Four Steps of the IPB Process 
a. Step One–Define the Battlefield Environment 
The first step of IPB includes identifying characteristics of the anticipated 
battlespace environment,189 including evaluating gaps in information and anticipated 
resource needs. This stage allows the analyst to determine what intelligence has already 
been gathered and what intelligence will need to be gathered in order to support decision-
making. This is akin to situational awareness in that the goal is to develop a good 
operating picture complete with all the relevant information. 
b. Step Two–Describe Battlefield Effects 
The second step of IPB is where the majority of the true analysis occurs. 
With the information gathered from Step One, an analyst will then assess them for 
pertinence to the operation, as well as potential impacts for the anticipated time frame. 
This analysis traditionally concentrated on weather and terrain190, as well as the 
capabilities of the enemy.   It has since expanded to include logistical, economic, 
political, and social demographics.191  This expansion was necessary as operations moved 
into a more urban environment,192 as infrastructure and the movement of people during 
an evolving situation creates an added challenge to decision-makers. 
A tool commonly utilized during this step of IPB is the assessment of the 
“OCOKA” factors of the AO.  “OCOKA” includes Observation and fields of fire, 
Concealment and cover, Obstacles, Key terrain, and Avenues of approach.193  Utilizing 
OCOKA provides the analyst with some common areas of concern and consideration for 
every mission, and acts as an intelligence checklist of sorts. It is most helpful in tactical 
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operations,194 but as with the rest of the IPB doctrine, is scalable to meet the needs of 
operational and strategic missions, as well. 
c. Step Three–Evaluate the Threat 
The focus in step three shifts to the enemy force (threat). Intelligence is 
gathered from as many sources as necessary to develop a robust picture of various aspects 
of the enemy. These include how the enemy conducts operations, high value targets in the 
enemy’s possession,195 as well as information pertaining to the size and capabilities of the 
enemy’s force. This step, in the absence of the structure of IPB, would be more 
commonly referred to as the threat analysis.196 
d. Step Four–Determine Threat Courses of Action  
The final step in the IPB doctrine is developing a prioritized list of 
potential enemy (threat) movements that are both most likely and most dangerous to 
friendly forces.197 The list should be as comprehensive as time permits; the detail of each 
potential enemy COA should follow this same criteria. Once the most likely enemy COA 
is identified, the ensuing collection strategy for the next iteration of the IPB within the 
event should reflect this decision.198  The IPB cycle continues and builds another layer on 
top of the previous one, reflecting both previous decisions and new intelligence gathered 
from sensors. 
2. Transferrable Concepts 
Similar to the FBI model presented earlier, the IPB doctrine presents a high-level 
model that aids in identifying needed information, provides a framework for collecting 
targeted data, and ultimately a process to convert that into intelligence. The framework is 
cyclical, and is able to accommodate the ongoing input of new information into the cycle. 
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IPB also considers the threat’s COA, helping the analyst to recommend the deployment 
of resources to the most probable area of engagement. All three of these aspects are 
helpful to EM, especially during an evolving event such a flood or hurricane. Their utility 
would be limited during a sudden event like an earthquake, but could be helpful in the 
mitigation efforts in establishing priorities for limited mitigation funds. 
The OCOKA concept is also of interest, as again this offers the analyst a checklist 
of common considerations to review as part of their intelligence production. This 
includes training all field personnel in basic observation techniques to gather information 
pertinent to intelligence development. The OCOKA process would be helpful to response 
and recovery efforts, primarily in planning the entry of resources into an impacted area to 
address the immediate needs of the victims. 
In addition to having transferrable intelligence concepts for the EM community, 
the military also has a role in domestic disaster response. The Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities mission includes “measures to foster mutual assistance and support between 
Department of Defense and civil government agencies in planning, preparation for, or in 
response to consequences of civil emergencies such as natural and man-made 
disasters.”199  During these operations, the development of situational awareness by 
Department of Defense operations adheres to the IPB process.200  Because of this role in 
support of the all-hazards mission, it is wise to also establish a common understanding, 
language or awareness of the IPB process for greater military-EM collaboration. 
C. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) is a policing approach that utilizes data analysis 
and crime intelligence within a “objective, decision-making framework that facilitates 
crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic 
management and effective enforcement strategies.201“ Through the use of this 
intelligence and analysis, law enforcement organizations can target areas of high criminal 
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activity and allocate resources accordingly. This allows law enforcement to police 
“smarter”202 with their current resources, rather than through increasing personnel and 
equipment.   
ILP represents a progression from previous law enforcement strategies, as 
intelligence is now an integral part of the mission of the organization,203 as opposed to 
the “undefined tangential activity as was too often the case in the past.”204  ILP is linked 
directly to the intelligence cycle, and provides a method for information to be converted 
to intelligence and subsequently disseminated to partners.205  Because of this, ILP is 
useful in complex, multi-jurisdictional operations206, particularly in the collaborative 
environment of SLFCs207 where agencies can pool resources and information. 
ILP is similar to the previous two models presented earlier, as it provides an 
intelligence function that aids decision-makers in the development of policies and 
strategies. It is also useful in providing “guidance on operational activities based on 
empirical evidence,”208 which then drives operations209 rather than the converse. ILP 
results in an “actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in 
developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning to emerging or changing 
threats.”210  Ratcliffe describes it through a 3i Model: intelligence interpreting the 
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environment and influencing decision-makers, who in turn impact the environment 
through actions (Figure 3).211 
 
Figure 3.  Ratcliffe’s 3i Model of Intelligence-Led Policing. 
ILP relies on three main tenets as part of the overarching strategy: two-way 
communications with the public and information management, scientific data analysis, 
and problem solving.212 To effectively implement ILP on any scale, all three tenets must 
be utilized to produce the most comprehensive intelligence and support effective 
decision-making.   
1. Intelligence-Led Policing Tenets 
a. Tenet One–Two-way Communications and Information 
Management 
Tenet One of ILP provides both the key raw data that will be utilized in 
the intelligence analysis, but also the means of dissemination once the data is refined and 
analyzed. ILP is dependent on information flow and feedback, regardless of whether it is 
crime analysis or intelligence analysis.213  The two-way communication could be better 
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stated as two sets of two-way communications as ILP engages both field officers and the 
public in dialogue.   
ILP is driven by an information flow that comes from the “boots on the 
ground,” line level employees214 who are in the field and in the best position to make 
observations of the true state of affairs. Officers must be trained not only how to identify 
hallmarks of criminal enterprises or potential hotspots, but also to “regularly channel that 
information to the intelligence unit for input into the intelligence cycle for analysis.”215  
Once the information has been submitted and analyzed through Tenets Two and Three, 
the ensuing intelligence is disseminated back to the field officers, completing the 
communications loop and creating a more informed police force. 
The public also plays a big role in the success of ILP in their community. 
The process begins with community education on the threats that exist within their 
community, and the methods for identifying suspicious behavior.216  Members of the 
community must also be made familiar with the “means of and processes for relaying 
observed (crime) data to the police officers and police organizations.”217 The data is then 
fed to the analysts, and the outcomes can be communicated back to the public through 
community meetings or community leaders in an effort to emphasize vigilance and create 
public awareness.218 
b. Tenet Two–Scientific Data Analysis 
With the information collected and corroborated through Tenet One, ILP 
relies heavily on scientific data and the utilization of technical processes for quality 
analysis.219  An example of this is the CompStat program, which collects and processes 
“crime and disorder data…to produce crime maps, trends, and other analysis 
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products.”220  The inputs are largely quantitative in nature (i.e., crime statistics within a 
geographic area, nature of arrests/interdictions, etc.), but the outputs given decision-
makers basis for qualitative decisions. The focus of the outputs is identifying prolific and 
persistent offenders,221 who are responsible for a majority of the crime, thereby 
warranting immediate attention. This scientific data then forms the hinge point222 (similar 
to the FBI’s Step Five) for the other two tenets, as information collected and products 
disseminated will be validated and refined through this analytical step. 
c. Tenet Three– Problem-Solving 
With the intelligence generated by Tenets One and Two, the impetus is 
then put on the decision-maker for how best to address the problems identified by the 
analysis. In addition to broad strategies for implementing tactics, operations and 
strategies, the ILP process is highly effective at providing an “objective basis for deciding 
priorities and resource allocation.”223  This gives ILP a more proactive posture,224 as 
action is being taken to reduce or prevent crime from taking hold in a particular area, 
rather than simply responding to emergency calls as they occur.   
At a multi-jurisdictional level, the intelligence received in this step also 
aids in the development of linkages225 and connections with intelligence from multiple 
agencies. Criminal enterprises do not adhere to jurisdictional boundaries, so the effort to 
collaborate to gain information and perform joint operations in a cross-jurisdictional area 
is ideal. With the inclusion of federal level assets in the SLFCs (such as the FBI), this 
benefit is greatly expanded as intelligence is shared externally,226 rather than cultivated 
with only in-house sources. 
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2. Transferrable Concepts 
The use of data and metrics in ILP to establish and inform decision-making 
processes is directly relevant to the EM community. Using these scientifically validated 
intelligence products generated by ILP would “enhance understanding of the operational 
environment and enable (EM) to make informed decisions on appropriate preparedness, 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery actions to mitigate incidents.”227  By 
gathering information on previous disasters, including metrics on cost of recovery, 
resources can be allocated on a much more informed basis. EM could focus the limited 
resources and policy efforts on these “prolific and persistent offenders,” and provide 
guidance to stakeholders on potential remedies. 
The other intriguing transferrable concept from ILP is the role of the community 
in reducing their vulnerability to threats and engaging them in an active way. Rather than 
broadly targeting preparedness in a generic form (“Be Ready”), the community is 
educated on specific threats that exist in their neighborhoods. The citizenry is also 
engaged in the problem-solving efforts through the identification of potential hazards, 
and ideally would engage in mitigation efforts as a result. Rather than relying on 
government sources for disaster recovery assistance, the community is encouraged to take 
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V. THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INTELLIGENCE 
CYCLE 
Research Question:  Is there a role for an intelligence process within the 
emergency management field? If so, what role could it play, what would 
the process look like, and how best could it be implemented to improve the 
all-hazards homeland security enterprise? 
In light of the information presented in Chapters I through IV, this chapter will 
return to the research question and present evidence that addresses each aspect 
individually. To accomplish this, the questions will be addressed in a reverse fashion 
(with the exception of the implementation portion), building on each other and providing 
both evidence and examples for an EM intelligence process. The implementation portion 
will follow as part of Chapter V. 
A. INTELLIGENCE IN EM–WHAT WOULD THE PROCESS LOOK LIKE? 
Given the three models presented in Chapter III, it is suggested that intelligence in 
EM should adhere to the most fundamental of the three models:  the FBI’s Intelligence 
Cycle. The steps are generic enough to apply directly to EM with minimal effort (as 
described below), and would allow the EM community to adopt a formalized process for 
intelligence that it currently lacks. However, the other models contain good principles the 
EM should not neglect. Therefore, the model presented below incorporates principles of 
both models that were not selected into the EM intelligence cycle. The six steps are as 
follows: 
1. Step One–Requirements 
The requirements step for the EM Intelligence Cycle (EMIC) would be identical 
to that of the FBI model. Once the EM intelligence community receives a request for an 
intelligence product, a similar process for establishing the parameters of the desired end 
product would be followed. The subject of the study could be from a wide variety of 
topics that are of importance to the EM field, including critical infrastructure 
vulnerability and potential for impacts from a given natural disaster. It could also require 
collaboration with the SLFC or IC to develop a dual, comprehensive intelligence product 
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on a target where both communities would play a role in prevention, response, or 
recovery. The type of analysis being requested would also be solidified, and the EM 
intelligence community would be able to provide current analysis, trend analysis, or long-
term assessments on the subject. 
2. Step Two–Planning and Direction 
The planning and direction step would also follow the FBI’s model for the basic 
functions and activities that would need to take place. A timeline would be established 
for the individual deliverables, giving sufficient time to conduct a thorough collection 
and analysis based on the requirements established during Step one. This step would also 
address the need for any subject matter expertise that might be required, whether it be a 
member of the EM community or an external partner (i.e., health, science, or technical). 
The appropriate finished product format would be determined, as the EM intelligence 
community would also be capable of providing all five categories identified by the 
ITACG.   
Step two would deviate slightly from the FBI model in that the EMIC’s model 
would include the implementation of IPB’s steps one and two. A certain amount of 
information on the current capabilities within the impacted jurisdiction would already be 
available due to an already established baseline capabilities assessment and general 
familiarity. With this information in mind, the EM intelligence community would know 
what intelligence has already been gathered and what intelligence will need to be 
gathered in order to support decision-making. This includes information that is readily 
available such as weather and terrain.   
Additionally, in order to support this step, the use of the OCOKA Process would 
be a powerful tool in establishing baseline capabilities as part of pre-event assessments. 
Conducted by local, county, Tribal, or State officials, the OCOKA model would provide 
information on: 
• General observations of the community (including demographics).  
• Concealment and cover (shelter from the event, areas of high ground). 
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• Obstacles—potential hotspots or areas that are prone to the effects of 
inclement weather and should be avoided. 
• Key terrain—areas that are crucial to protect due to second-order effects, 
including those that are of symbolic or cultural importance to the citizens. 
• Avenues of approach—routes of ingress and egress that are safe for first 
responders to utilize, as well as for evacuations of residents, if necessary. 
Based on this information, collection requirements could be established, priorities 
could be determined, and assessments of key facilities within these parameters could be 
requested. 
3. Step Three–Collection 
With the requirements, planning, and assessment of baseline capabilities 
completed, the collection of information necessary to complete the product would then 
ensue. Although similar in the basic function of collection, the EMIC would employ 
different methods of collection to complete the assessment. This is understandable given 
the nature of the areas of interest, but the EM intelligence community could utilize an 
INT categorization to determine what types of intelligence would be most pertinent and 
useful to the inquiry. The EM INTs that could be tapped into would be: 
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)–the least applicable to the EM intelligence 
community, SIGINT could be utilized to monitor radio communications 
openly (not clandestinely) between first responders or potential victims for 
the sake of collecting pertinent information. Such SIGINT could employ 
the assistance of Ham Radio Operators, either employed by the agency or 
part of a volunteer EM organization (such as the FEMA-endorsed Radio 
Amateur Civil Emergency Services group228) 
• Imagery and Geospatial Intelligence (IMINT/GEOINT)–GIS capabilities 
are now commonplace in EOC’s with data available both on-hand (pre-
event) and capabilities from regional assets (FEMA Regions229 and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s satellite feeds230). 
These could be supported by real-time feeds from first responders, 
surveillance cameras in the impacted area, and strategically placed EM 
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resources deployed to provide such imagery. The United States Air Force 
Auxiliary’s Civil Air Patrol231 or other air assets that provide aerial views 
of the ongoing event or impacted area could also support this capability. 
• Measurements and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)–the EM intelligence 
community could greatly benefit from the utilization of technical experts 
who could provide scientifically developed intelligence on the potential 
patterns or impacts of various events. Seismologists, hydrologists, and 
nuclear/chemical/environmental/ structural engineers could provide 
valuable insight that is beyond the traditional scope of EM expertise and 
help determine potential courses of action. Such experts could also be used 
prior to events to conduct research on potential areas of failure or impact, 
leading to the development of mitigation and protection priorities. 
• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)–the use of open sources to collect 
information is a goldmine of raw data, although it must be put through the 
intelligence cycle in order to validate the information that is being shared. 
The news media is a good source of OSINT, as they are often on the scene 
with cameras rolling shortly after an incident begins. Additionally, social 
media has seen a surge in the last decade, and sites like Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram, and Flickr provide real-time information in an easily searchable 
format. For example, a study conducted on the use of Twitter during the 
Joplin tornado of 2011 found that 206,764 unique tweets were posted with 
the hashtag #joplin  a few hours after the tornado hit.232  A similar tactic 
was used during the El Reno tornado in May of 2013, when Oklahoma 
Emergency Management use “social media to gain situational awareness 
about the level of damage in the early hours following the storms,”233 
when information from the field was sparse. Capitalizing on this source of 
information, EM organizations ranging the gambit from international234 to 
local235 have taken to Twitter to gather information during events. Specific 
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management (i.e., Recovery236). Properly mined and analyzed, these 
sources of information could prove invaluable to the EM intelligence 
community. 
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)–the HUMINT role within EM becomes 
another powerful source of information with the introduction of the ILP 
principle of using field sensors to gain information. These field sensors 
would come from the EM and first responder communities, but could also 
come from the general citizenry of the area of concern, as well. Residents 
of an area who have seen direct impacts in the past could be a good source 
of historical data on vulnerable areas. Coupled with the public education 
loops within ILP, citizens could be trained as field sensors and work with 
local EM staff to provide information on specific subjects. This 
development of HUMINT also has the second-order effect of engaging 
citizens in both resilience and recovery efforts. This engagement of 
citizens is the crux of FEMA’s “Whole Community” campaign,237 a part 
of the all-hazards concept. 
This collection of information should also include reports that are already 
proliferated throughout the EM community. For example, on a daily basis the Arizona 
Division of Emergency Management receives situation reports from the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, NOAA, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, FEMA, and the U.S. Department of the Interior. These reports offer both 
national and local level information that should be considered as part of Steps Four and 
Five. 
4. Step Four-–Processing and Exploitation 
The processing and exploitation step of the EM intelligence cycle would 
encompass the process of sorting through the data, determining what is relevant, and 
ensuring it is in a form that is usable to analysts. This includes data reduction, as in cases 
where the data is voluminous (such as the Twitter example above), the information must 
be culled significantly. ILP’s emphasis on metrics would be pertinent here, especially if it 
aids the data reduction effort. Being able to provide analysts, and subsequently decision-
makers, empirical data that helps in establishing historical trends and forecasting future 
likely scenarios is a powerful capability. This step would also include a loop back to Step 
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Three if gaps in the information are detected through preliminary evaluation. As in the 
FBI model, this could occur either prior to or concurrently with a move to Step Five. 
5. Step Five–Analysis and Production 
The area of analysis and production is where EM could most benefit from a 
formalized process. Without this key step, information is not transformed into a product 
that is validated and consolidated to provide only the essential data required for decision-
makers. Among these decisions is the allocation of resources, as accentuated by the ILP 
model. With a finite amount of equipment on hand, a leader needs to have intelligence on 
the potential scope of the event and subsequently determine where to place these 
resources, as well as if outreach to other agencies for support personnel and equipment is 
warranted. This support system is already in place through mutual aid agreements, the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact,238 and multiple federal resources; 
however, without a formalized intelligence process this decision is left to individual EM 
entities to determine. This approach defaults to a reactive posture, as resources are a 
consideration as the event unfolds and raw information flows into EOCs, rather than prior 
to the event or immediately after the onset through the formalized intelligence process. 
The analysis step should also employ Step Four of the IPB process and take into 
consideration the potential courses of action of the threat. Although this is exceptionally 
more difficult for immediate natural events (such as earthquakes or tornados), evolving 
events (such as floods and hurricanes) are far more predictable. Studies of watersheds and 
flow capacities of critical runoff areas are feasible both before and during an event, and 
key decisions on moving resources, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the 
release of water from potentially impacted dams and levees would all serve to reduce 
impacts of the event. As an example, New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
suspended subway service prior to the landfall of Hurricane Irene, marking the “first time 
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public officials closed the system in preparation for a storm.”239 Additionally, the MTA 
crews “moved trains and other valuable equipment to higher ground, blocked station 
entrances, covered vents, and positioned pump trains and emergency generators in 
locations where they could be immediately used after the surge.”240 By evaluating the 
courses of action of these events, preparations can be made to reduce the loss of life and 
property. 
The other consideration during this step is to determine what type of product will 
be most appropriate to convey the intelligence. This is dictated primarily by the 
requirements step, but the EM community could consider a more finite range of products 
similar to the FBI or national IC community. A categorical system of situation reports, 
bulletins, and assessments would give the EM intelligence community a template for 
reporting that could then be sent to multiple jurisdictions or partners in a standardized 
format that would be easily read and understood.   
6. Step Six–Dissemination 
As depicted in all three models reviewed in Chapter III, the dissemination of the 
intelligence is the ultimate goal. Intelligence for intelligence’s sake is of no benefit; it is 
only when given to decision-makers that intelligence becomes action (or a concerted 
decision for inaction) that intelligence reaches its intended end state. In addition to 
decision-makers, the intelligence could also be disseminated to multi-jurisdictional and 
multi-discipline partners who may benefit from greater situational awareness that informs 
their own decision-making processes. The intelligence could also be disseminated to the 
community according to the ILP model for their review, awareness, and possible action. 
This dissemination to the community can occur through either direct interaction with 
community leaders or through public education efforts to the citizenry as a whole. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. 
Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
The threat environment facing today’s HSE is both complex and evolving; in 
order to meet the challenge this dynamic situation presents, our all-hazards community 
must also consider changes to current practices that limit our collaboration, efficiency, 
and posture. As suggested by the findings of this thesis, a key area of opportunity is the 
use of a well-defined intelligence model that would at minimum improve the capabilities 
of EM to better prevent and mitigate impacts from natural disasters when possible, 
protect citizens and critical infrastructure from adverse impacts, respond intelligently to 
incidents, and ultimately recover quickly from events that are unavoidable. As 
highlighted in Chapter V, the process currently exists to some degree yet lacks definition 
and wholesale implementation; therefore, the adoption of the EMIC would be fairly basic 
and require a minimal investment of time and funding. In line with current emphasis from 
FEMA and DHS, this effort should begin at the local and state level with Federal support 
and guidance, and should consider the following recommendations for implementation: 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Develop a nationwide EM Intelligence Officer program to be implemented at 
the state and local level that initially consists of key current EM personnel 
who have related duties. Once identified, introduce the EMIC process to the 
EM Intelligence Officers, and further develop a role in routine EM 
operations for its use.   
The first step towards implementing the EMIC and bolstering the all-hazards 
community with this capability would be developing a nationwide EM Intelligence 
Officer program establishing some common standards for implementation and use of the 
EMIC. This step would rely heavily on identifying key current local and state EM 
personnel whose positions or skill sets most closely match those required of the 
Intelligence Function. Personnel within the Response or Mitigation mission areas may 
provide a base for the initial push, as both are integrally involved in activities that 
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correlate to the Collection and Analysis & Production steps of the EMIC. Mitigation, in 
particular, commonly has ties to key resources outside the EM community (such as 
scientists or engineers), and those connections would provide valuable data for the 
EMIC; the EM Intelligence Officers would be dependent on such sources, and it logically 
follows that the EM Intelligence program start where those relationships exist. Mitigation 
is also best poised, through both their daily activities and resources (i.e., federal 
mitigation grants) to implement the intelligence products and work to improve the 
posture of EM. By starting with current EM staff, the initial cost outlay for implementing 
the EMIC is minimized, resources are more efficiently used through an EMIC-driven 
process, and we ensure that the initial cadre of EM Intelligence Officers is familiar with 
EM concepts and missions. Their initial focus would be exploring, refining, and 
integrating the concepts discussed in Chapter III, improving EM’s role and capabilities in 
all five national mission areas. 
The introduction of the EMIC to the EM community and larger IC as a whole 
would also be streamlined by the identification of a static role within routine operations 
where EM Intelligence Officers could function, ideally in a consistent manner 
nationwide. Using the Intelligence/Investigation Function guidelines as developed by 
FEMA in 2008 that defined the roles and responsibilities within an Incident Command 
System structure,241 this role should then be expanded to include both field and routine 
operations to ensure constant input of information into the EMIC. Each jurisdiction 
interested in the utilization of such a function should then consider which personnel from 
their EM operations could best fill this role based on the identified need of their specific 
threat environment and the guidelines provided above. 
Once the role is defined, a training regimen for EM Intelligence Officers 
should be developed and implemented based on training for the current IC. 
Once the role is defined and some loose initial parameters are established for 
preliminary deployment, the EM Intelligence Officers will require training that blends the 
development and use of intelligence with EM concepts to ensure immediate application. 
Although a new concept to the EM community, the EMIC will benefit from established 
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training and practices in the current IC. This would include training alongside 
Intelligence Analysts in the current state-level IC, such as the Specialized Analytic 
Seminar Series identified as a primary curriculum for SLFC personnel.242  The EM 
Intelligence Officers would be trained in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative,243 which has pre-identified EM as key members, and will also foster cross-
discipline collaboration on information gathering outside of the traditional EM 
responsibilities. With an intelligence process foundation, the training would then graduate 
to a more specific EM-oriented program that would include the EMIC, best practices 
from current use, and the incorporation of subject-matter experts on relevant topics. With 
a trained cadre of EM Intelligence Officers developed, the EMIC concept could then push 
forward into the third recommendation. 
Development of local level multi-disciplinary teams who will be primarily 
responsible for implementation of the EMIC at the ground level, 
collaborating on assessing the local threat environment, and developing 
intelligence products. 
The third recommendation would be accomplished at the State, county, or local 
level, depending on need and personnel, and be primarily responsible for implementing 
EMIC principles and processes at the local level. Based on the Local Emergency 
Planning Committee concept currently employed by the Hazardous Materials response 
community, this group would streamline the IC and be able to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the all-hazards threat environment that policy makers (i.e., 
Mayors, Governors) require.244 The coordination group would include representation 
from the IC, EM, and first responder communities, as well as other agencies that are key 
sources of intelligence given the local threat environment.   
As an intermediary between the IC and local/State EOC, the group would be 
responsible for acting on requests for intelligence from policy makers, as well as 
disseminating information back to the community responsible for preparing and 
responding to the threat. This solution would also give both communities an opportunity 
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to meet on a regular basis and “foster an ongoing understanding and appreciation of the 
roles, responsibilities and current endeavors undertaken by each center.”245 Members of 
this group could be used during an incident to expedite resources and also provide 
liaisons or personnel when requested246 ensuring expertise is available where needed. The 
EM Intelligence Officers could work closely with Terrorism Liaison Officer programs, 
where established, and collaborate on intelligence requests that had a requirement for an 
all-hazards analysis. Based on prior events and successes, key roles could include: 
• Intelligence support to incident command247 
• Situation reports that include current information on locations of shelters, 
road closures, status of transportation, and overall state of the disaster248 
• Damage assessments following an event to help prioritize response and 
recovery efforts249 
• Threat and risk assessments prior to an event to ensure comprehensive, 
intelligent planning 
The EMIC plays a key role in the above groups from both a philosophical and 
practical level. Without an EMIC, collaboration would relegate the EM participants to 
their current information provider role. However, with a well-defined EMIC in place, EM 
has an equivalent role in both groups and plays a key role in the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of intelligence that strengthens the all-hazards community. The foundation 
that the EMIC provides allows for common language and understanding amongst the 
partners. As the groups continue to collaborate, trust is built, victories are won, and the 
process is refined for maximum benefit. 
Development of a State-Level Coordination Group to oversee the statewide 
implementation of the EMIC and define policies and parameters for a SLFC-
EM collaboration. 
Concurrently with the implementation of the first three recommendations, a 
critical final piece towards achieving this goal would be to establish a State level 
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coordination group that would act as an intermediary between the SLFC and EOC. 
Without the support and leadership of Directors and high-level officials from both sides 
who can champion the effort, the EMIC will not have direct impact on the all-hazards 
preparedness of the State and local governments. As the primary connection to the IC, 
this group would not only be able to provide the best avenue to get the EMIC 
implemented, but also outline the connections to the larger all-hazards community and 
readily identify points of application. Amongst the State-Level Coordination Groups that 
already exist in the SLFC, just over 50 percent include EM partners in their governing 
boards;250 the template for such a high-level Coordination Group is already roughly 
modeled. This group could lean on Federal policy yet simultaneously develop guidelines 
that would help best address the demographic and geographic nuances of their area of 
responsibility.   
This group could also determine whether a joint SLFC-EOC operation was 
warranted given their current and anticipated future threat environment. Although this 
combination may not be warranted in every situation, this group could consider 
established joint operations and determine suitability for their situation. The State-Level 
Coordination Group could consider the successes of states such as New Jersey, where the 
Regional Operations and intelligence Center has combined both an SLFC and EOC. The 
ROIC supports the all-hazards community by analyzing and sharing information that 
includes both natural and man-made disasters, and played a key role in the overall 
response operations from events like 2012’s Superstorm Sandy.251  This type of 
collaboration should be considered by the SLFCs and EOCs of every state in light of 
potential benefits and capability strengthening. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The introduction and proliferation of the all-hazards approach to homeland 
security has presented the HSE with great opportunities to improve our current range of 
operations and strengthen our capabilities. As identified in Chapter I, the all-hazards 
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concept seeks to increase collaboration, reduce inefficiencies, and improve national 
posture for both man-made and natural events. The development and use of intelligence 
will play a key role in all three of these areas, but requires implementation of intelligence 
capabilities across the HSE partners. The EM community falls woefully behind in this 
area; the EMIC is a solid foundation from which to develop this capability within EM, as 
well as foster greater collaboration amongst the all-hazards partners. Such a process will 
“encourage a broader perspective on risks and how to deal with them and a broader 
foundation on which to build effective programs to manage hazards and disasters.”252  
The EMIC strengthens the all-hazards community and provides a significant step forward 
in achieving the all-hazard goals: 
1. Collaboration   
The National Intelligence Strategy states that three of its enterprise objectives are 
to, “build familiarity of the IC and its capabilities, expand partnerships, and establish new 
partnerships.”253 The EM community, through the EMIC, can capitalize on this objective 
and bring a capability to the HSE table that adds dimension and depth to the all-hazards 
community. Collaboration on assessing risks that will require responses from all partners 
will foster a partnership that positively benefits all stages of an incident. The EMIC also 
improves the flow of intelligence information, established channels for dissemination, 
and proper handling of intelligence. In light of ever-increasing information sharing 
requirements established by Federal policy makers (i.e., HR 1542, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Information Sharing Bill254), the EMIC establishes a means by which this 
information is received and handled.  
2. Reducing Inefficiencies 
The EMIC fosters greater all-hazards planning, and is inherently more cost and 
time effective. Rather than conducting risk assessments, gathering key situational 
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information, and developing strategies for future events in a silo, these activities are 
conducted in concert with other partners charged with roles in planning, response, and 
recovery. It facilitates a centralized approach whereby policy-makers are provided 
comprehensive intelligence assessments, resources are coordinated and managed, and 
leadership can make well-informed, timely decisions. The EMIC helps expedite the 
information gathering process within the EM community itself, as the process pre-
identifies considerations and frames the intended outcomes, establishing structure where 
there is currently little. 
3. Posture 
Most importantly, the EMIC will dramatically improve the posture of the EM 
community, and as a natural consequence, the HSE as a whole. The EMIC encourages a 
more proactive approach to all-hazards planning, and also promotes a broader perspective 
that includes consideration of political, psychological, social and economic impact of 
events.255  By defining and formalizing a process of intelligence within EM, practitioners 
would require information in advance of an event to provide adequate context, and 
thereby pushing a big portion of information gathering to the front-end of an event. 
Rather than waiting for information to flow into the EOC in disorganized pieces, EM 
Intelligence Officers are proactively seeking information to feed into the EMIC, and 
evaluating the information against a pre-established framework. Because the EMIC also 
supports collaboration and efficiency of resources, it provides a more comprehensive 
approach to EM that allows for a better posture. 
As Sun Tzu observed in the quote that began this chapter, knowing our 
capabilities and limitations is only a small portion of the battle. To achieve the most 
comprehensive victory as possible in our HSE goals and objectives, we must also know 
the hazards we face and the peripheral factors that also play a role in our all-hazards 
preparedness, response, and recovery. Across the national EM and all-hazards landscape, 
this mindset exists to varying degrees. However, without a formalized process for 
intelligence within EM, the victory will struggle to be comprehensive enough to consider 
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the range of factors that each event presents. The EMIC provides this process, and 
enables our all-hazards community to intelligently address the threat environment we 
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